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 INTRODUCTION 
The right of publicity gives people the right to control the use of their 
names and likenesses for commercial purposes. For years, courts have 
struggled to make sense of two dimensions of this right—what it means to use a 
name or likeness “commercially,” and what aspects of a person’s “likeness” are 
protected against appropriation. In the absence of any clear theoretical 
foundation for the right of publicity, the meanings of these terms have steadily 
swelled, to the point at which virtually any reference to an individual that 
brings financial benefit to someone else qualifies as a violation of the right of 
publicity.1 At the same time, the courts have developed no meaningful 
counterweight to this ever-expanding right. Instead, they have created a few ad 
hoc exceptions in cases where the sweeping logic of the right of publicity 
seems to lead to results they consider unfair. 
Two types of publicity claims have raised particular problems for the 
courts. The first involves “merchandising” claims, in which individuals claim 
violation of their publicity right not by the use of a name in advertising, but by 
the sale of products that bear their names or likenesses. Courts have generally 
resolved these claims by making a distinction between “news” or “speech,” on 
the one hand, and “merchandise,” on the other. But as art and information 
become increasingly commodified, this distinction—if it ever made sense—has 
become ever harder to sustain.2 The second type of problematic claim involves 
cases in which a use draws attention away from the celebrity or arguably sullies 
the celebrity’s reputation in some way that harms the overall value of her 
identity. Properly limited, such a cause of action might have some theoretical 
appeal, but courts have applied it in ways that exceed any plausible theoretical 
justification, particularly when First Amendment considerations enter the fray. 
One root of the problems with these cases lies in the elusiveness of a 
theoretical justification for the right of publicity. When the government can 
clearly identify a reason to limit speech, courts have some basis on which to 
evaluate whether the speech limitation lives up to that purpose. But because the 
right of publicity rests upon a slew of sometimes sloppy rationalizations, courts 
have little way of determining whether a particular speech limitation is 
 
1. Indeed, some states suggest that any advantage—economic or otherwise—can lead 
to a right of publicity violation. See, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 & n.4 
(9th Cir. 2005); White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(defining the right as applying to “appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to 
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise” (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 
198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983)).  
2. Cf. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(distinguishing between the First Amendment protection given to fine art, which was 
“expression,” and that given to commercial art, which was “commercial speech”); Comedy 
III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810-11 (Cal. 2001) (attempting to 
distinguish between art that merely exploits and art that comments, and thereby falls within 
First Amendment protection). 
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necessary or even appropriate in order to serve the law’s normative goals.3 
Instead, they appear to assume that the sum of a set of inadequate justifications 
equals far more than its parts and allow right of publicity claims to run 
roughshod over the speech interests of the public. 
If the absence of a rationale has created the problem, then the answer lies 
in identifying whether and when a right of publicity might serve a legitimate 
government interest. Yet a review of the cases and literature reveals that no one 
seems to be able to explain exactly why individuals should have this right. A 
right of privacy can’t justify it, for the right of publicity has been applied in a 
wide range of situations that don’t implicate privacy at all. Some commentators 
have proposed a natural or moral right of control over one’s name or likeness,4 
but there seems to be no policy justification for giving such control, and the 
absence of such a right in most of the world and indeed throughout most of 
U.S. history should make us skeptical of claims based on some consensus 
moral belief.5 The moral claim to own the use of one’s name also seems 
inconsistent with the absence of natural or moral rights justifications for other 
forms of intellectual property (IP) in the United States.6 
Of late, and particularly in the merchandising cases, courts and 
commentators have looked to copyright law in an attempt to justify and delimit 
the right of publicity. On the affirmative side, they contend that copyright law’s 
incentive-based rationale supports the publicity right. Reasoning that the right 
of publicity gives individuals the incentive to develop valuable personas, courts 
conclude that depriving those individuals of the fruits of their labors will 
interfere with those economic incentives. On the defense side, some courts 
have even gone so far as to create a fair use doctrine, importing from copyright 
law judicially created limits on the enforcement of the right. This approach 
turns the right of publicity into a new form of IP right, one based explicitly on 
analogies to and justifications for real property. 
 
3. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right into the Right of Publicity?, 9 
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 35, 47-49 (1998). 
4. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 2:1 (2d ed. 
2005); cf. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of 
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (noting parallels between moral rights and right of publicity). 
5. Indeed, advocates of publicity rights in other countries use the United States as their 
model. See, e.g., Jan Klink, 50 Years of Publicity Rights in the United States and the Never-
Ending Hassle with Intellectual Property and Personality Rights in Europe, 2003 INTELL. 
PROP. Q. 363, 387 (claiming that “50 years of daily practice have proven the advantages of 
separate publicity rights in the United States”). Japan recognized a right of publicity in 1976. 
See Hanrei Times (No. 1071) 294, Nagoya High Ct., Mar. 8, 2001. 
6. As others have pointed out, intellectual property law in the United States often 
reflects undercurrents of moral rights considerations. See, e.g., Ilhyung Lee, Toward an 
American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795 (2001); Neil Netanel, 
Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative 
Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 393-98 (1993). Nonetheless, the dominant model, and the 
one reflected in the U.S. Constitution, is utilitarian. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Thinking about the right of publicity by analogy to IP law may indeed be 
helpful. But we think copyright is the wrong analogy for a number of reasons. 
First, in the United States, copyright law is utilitarian. We grant copyrights in 
order to encourage the creation of new works of authorship. There is no similar 
justification for the right of publicity. Society doesn’t need to encourage more 
celebrities or more marketing of celebrity image. Nor is there any evidence 
that, even if such a result were desirable, a property-like right of publicity is 
well tailored to that goal. Second, copyright’s fair use doctrine involves 
tradeoffs between the interests of original creators and those who would like to 
make transformative uses of their creative works. The right of publicity has no 
similar tradeoff.7 Third, copyright’s fair use doctrine is confusing to the point 
of incoherence and is hardly a model anyone would wish to emulate. Finally, 
the analogy to copyright can obscure important free speech interests at stake in 
right of publicity cases. For better or worse, copyright laws have gotten a free 
ride when it comes to the First Amendment. The copyright analogy may 
prompt courts to mistakenly extend that free ride in the right of publicity 
context. 
Logically, the right of publicity has more in common with trademark law 
than with copyright. The right of publicity protects a celebrity’s interest in her 
name and likeness, much as trademark law protects a business’s name and 
other trademarks. Both areas of law give rights-holders some measure of 
control over the meaning of their identities by permitting them to control the 
use of associated symbols.8 The Lanham Act has traditionally accomplished 
this end by preventing commercial uses of trademarks that are likely to confuse 
consumers regarding either the source of goods or the affiliation, endorsement, 
or sponsorship of those goods by the trademark owner.9 The right of publicity 
aims to do the same thing for celebrities by preventing the use of a celebrity’s 
name or likeness in advertising or promotion to falsely suggest that she has 
endorsed the advertised product. Both forms of legal protection promote not 
only the rights-holder’s interests, but also those of the public. Trademark 
holders and celebrities can prevent the deceptive appropriation of the meaning 
associated with their goodwill and identity, while consumers can buy products 
with confidence in the truth of assertions about who makes, sponsors, endorses, 
and stands behind those goods.10 
 
7. There is a tradeoff of interests between the celebrity and the user, of course, but 
because the celebrity is not creating anything, there is no utilitarian balancing calculus 
analogous to that in copyright. 
8. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
10. Arguably no one should care whether or not Catherine Zeta-Jones endorses one 
particular brand of cell phone. But apparently we do: celebrity product endorsement is big 
business. In a market economy, the right of publicity quite reasonably takes this consumer 
preference as a given and tries to make sure that even if consumers are irrational in 
preferring celebrity-endorsed products, they are at least not deceived as to the endorsement 
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More recently, the Lanham Act has been expanded to prevent dilution of 
famous trademarks by commercial uses that draw attention away from the 
trademark owner or throw it into disrepute, even if the uses do not confuse the 
public. Dilution, too, has analogies in the right of publicity. Uses of a 
celebrity’s name might in rare circumstances undermine the connection 
between the name and that celebrity or, more likely, might tarnish the 
reputation of the celebrity by using her name or likeness in a disreputable 
connection, even in the absence of confusion or assumptions of endorsement. 
In these narrow circumstances, a cause of action may be appropriate. 
Finally, a few courts have expanded trademark law to include a general 
right to control the merchandising of goods bearing a trademark even in the 
absence of confusion or dilution, though this expansion rests on dubious legal 
grounds. This merchandising right too has analogues in the right of publicity. 
Indeed, the emergence of a property-like form of the right of publicity can best 
be understood as an adoption of the putative trademark merchandising right, 
with judicial decisions reflecting the same anti-free-riding instincts that 
informed the merchandising cases in the trademark context. 
Reconceiving the right of publicity as a trademark-like right offers 
significant benefits in defining the right’s scope and limitations. First, it 
provides a helpful way to think about the different sorts of claims made under 
the rubric of publicity. We have considerable experience with each of these 
types of claims in trademark law, and applying that knowledge to right of 
publicity cases can help us understand why we might (or might not) want to 
prohibit particular uses. Most importantly, looking at the right of publicity 
through the lens of trademark law offers logical ways to limit the right. 
Trademarks are not property rights in the traditional sense, though a few courts 
and commentators have suggested that trademark owners should have property-
like rights over their marks. Trademark cases tend instead to be decided either 
based on likelihood of confusion or on dilution grounds, both of which bear a 
clear relationship to the goal of protecting trademarks as informational symbols 
in the marketplace.11 Both trademark infringement and dilution also 
 
of those products. 
11. Trademark law has, of course, witnessed occasional departures from this goal, both 
in the merchandising cases and in a series of recent cases involving the Internet. See, e.g., 
Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing 
claim against Internet search engine that used trademark as keyword to generate 
advertisements); Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 
(5th Cir. 1975) (holding that trademark claim in merchandising context does not require 
confusion). As we have pointed out elsewhere, however, both of these expansions are 
problematic as a matter of trademark law and hardly deserve emulation in the right of 
publicity context. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: 
Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) (discussing the merchandising 
theory) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right]; Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 
(2004) (discussing Internet-related expansions) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks 
and Consumer Search Costs]. 
DOGAN & LEMLEY 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 3/15/2006 8:00:36 PM 
1166 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1161 
incorporate significant limiting principles designed to balance the interests of 
other parties against the interests of trademark owners and to accommodate 
First Amendment concerns. The failure to incorporate these limitations into the 
right of publicity has resulted in a mutant version of trademark policy that 
promotes some of the law’s objectives, but views them in isolation, with neither 
contours nor counterweight. 
If, as we believe, a properly conceived right of publicity promotes the same 
core goals as trademark law, then a proper understanding of the right of 
publicity would draw more completely on trademark principles in defining the 
scope and the limitations of the publicity right. The overlap is not perfect, and 
we anticipate some continuing role for a separate publicity right, but the 
trademark framework should suit the vast majority of right of publicity cases. 
Even when it doesn’t, understanding the differences between trademark law 
and the right of publicity will help us to comprehend and cabin the publicity 
right. Doctrinally, such an approach would limit the right to circumstances in 
which the use of an individual’s name or likeness in connection with the sale of 
a product is likely either to confuse consumers or to dilute the significance of a 
famous name.12 Revising the right of publicity to conform to the rules we have 
worked out in trademark cases will avoid some of the worst abuses of the right, 
limit the conflict between the right of publicity and First Amendment 
principles, and put the right on a more solid conceptual grounding. 
In Part I, we describe the growth of the right of publicity from its narrow 
privacy origins to a virtually unlimited, descendible, assignable property right. 
Part I discusses two particular excesses that this trend has brought about and 
that are increasingly creating problems for the courts and the public: the 
expanding merchandising right and the dilution-like cause of action. Part II 
discusses the existing efforts to explain the growth of the right of publicity. 
Those explanations have generally focused on incentive-based rationales akin 
to copyright law—rationales whose logic breaks down in the right of publicity 
context. Part II goes on to explain why copyright law proves inadequate to 
justify the right of publicity and to define its scope, with particular reference to 
merchandising and dilution-like cases. In Part III, we offer a new explanation 
for the right of publicity, one based in trademark principles. Part III shows how 
the right of publicity has adopted some but not all of the rules of trademark law 
and how a more complete importation of trademark principles into publicity 
law would solve many of the problems that plague the doctrine. Finally, in Part 
 
12. There is one exception. Occasional right of publicity cases draw on the traditional 
conception of the tort as a privacy right, rather than on a property-based attempt to control 
revenue from commercial exploitation of a celebrity persona. E.g., Minnifield v. Ashcraft, 
903 So. 2d 818, 824 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (recognizing “commercial-appropriation 
invasion-of-privacy tort” in suit against tattoo parlor for unauthorized publication of 
photographs of a tattoo on plaintiff’s breast). The use of the right of publicity to protect 
privacy does not draw on trademark principles, and it may provide an alternative basis for a 
publicity claim. See infra notes 224-30. It is a relatively minor alternative basis, however; 
most modern publicity cases are not in fact efforts to protect privacy. 
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IV we consider some objections and compare our approach to alternative 
approaches for dealing with the problems of the publicity right. 
I. EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Before the late nineteenth century, individuals had little recourse against 
the use of their names or images by unauthorized parties. Except in the unusual 
cases of libel or trademark infringement,13 individuals could do nothing to 
prevent the use of their identities for either commercial or noncommercial 
purposes.14 It is hard to overstate the contrast between then and now. These 
days, virtually any profit-oriented use of a name or identity is presumed to be 
wrongful, with the defendant bearing the burden of establishing that its use falls 
within some protected exception. How did we get here? 
While one could slice the history in many different ways, we find it useful 
to divide the right of publicity’s evolution into two general phases: the privacy 
phase and the modern phase. The privacy phase—which began in the late 
1800s—involved the courts’ recognition, for the first time, of the right of 
individuals to limit the use of their names or likenesses by commercial actors. 
Most privacy cases involved noncelebrities, and the privacy phase is thus often 
treated as a precursor to the right of publicity rather than a first step in its 
evolution.15 In fact, however, many courts interpreted the right of privacy to 
encompass an important publicity-like right: the right against false 
endorsements, available to celebrities and noncelebrities alike. A half century 
later, courts and legislatures began to recognize a much broader right of 
celebrities to prevent commercial use of their identities, without regard to 
whether the use suggested false endorsement or whether the celebrity had 
actively sought out the spotlight. It was this shift in emphasis—from protecting 
the integrity of an individual’s identity to protecting the economic value of 
celebrity as an alienable economic right—that ushered in the modern age of 
publicity rights, with all its attendant tensions. 
A. Privacy Origins 
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their famous law 
 
13. Trademark infringement, at the time, was defined much more restrictively than 
today, requiring not only that the mark at issue qualify as a trademark, but also that the 
infringer use a virtually identical mark on a directly competing product. See, e.g., Borden Ice 
Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912) (finding no 
infringement of Borden milk mark by seller of Borden ice cream). 
14. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 148-52 (1993) (describing widespread commercial 
exploitation of celebrity images through the late 1800s). 
15. E.g., id. at 167 (“The right of publicity was created not so much from the right of 
privacy as from frustration with it.”).  
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review article proposing a new “Right to Privacy.”16 The article lamented both 
technological and cultural developments that had shrunk the realm of the 
private17 and called for courts to reverse this trend by recognizing a right of 
individuals “to be let alone.”18 A privacy right, the authors asserted, would 
serve two important goals. First and most obviously, it would redress the harms 
that private individuals suffered from invasions of their privacy—harms that 
the authors described as “mental pain and distress, far greater than could be 
inflicted by mere bodily injury.”19 But the authors professed a more 
overarching goal: to arrest what they perceived as a downward spiral in the 
content and quality of journalism in the United States.20 “Triviality,” they 
asserted, “destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No 
enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting 
influence.”21 By forbidding the publication of idle gossip (at least without 
permission), Warren and Brandeis apparently believed that they could restore 
“propriety” and “decency” to the press.22 
The legal claim proposed by Warren and Brandeis reflected their core 
concern with avoiding crass invasions by an overreaching press. Although their 
article occasionally strayed into broad generalities suggesting that individuals 
should have property rights in their personalities,23 their proposed cause of 
 
16. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
17. Id. at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the 
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to 
make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.’”). The authors purportedly seized upon the subject after a newspaper published 
intimate details of a Warren-family event. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 
383, 383 (1960); cf. Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and 
the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 629 & n.28 (2002) (“Although there 
is some disagreement among scholars over whether Warren was disturbed about a specific 
report in a Boston newspaper regarding private affairs of his own family, Warren was, by all 
accounts, the one who initiated the idea of writing the article.”). 
18. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 205. 
19. Id. at 196. 
20. Warren and Brandeis believed that the newspapers, by publishing unsavory gossip, 
had driven demand for such content and thereby impaired public literacy. Id. (“In this, as in 
other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand . . . . Easy of comprehension, 
appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the 
misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of 
interest in brains capable of other things.”). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. A century later, the debate over the relationship between privacy and the press 
persists. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right To Gather 
News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1999) (exploring “whether laws should be passed 
to curb the practices of paparazzi, and whether the media should be liable for engaging in 
aggressive newsgathering techniques or for publishing private facts”). 
23. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 205 (discussing individuals’ interest in 
their “inviolate personality”); id. at 207 (identifying a “right to privacy, as a part of the more 
general right to the immunity of the person, the right to one’s personality”); id. at 211 (“The 
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action focused narrowly on the problem at hand: “to protect the privacy of 
private life.”24 As such, the right would not apply to information that the 
individual had voluntarily disclosed25 or to information in which the public had 
a legitimate interest. The right, instead, should apply only to the publication of 
“matters . . . which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an 
individual, and have no legitimate connection” with his public position or with 
“any act done by him in a public or quasi public capacity.”26 
Slowly at first, and then with increasing enthusiasm, courts and legislatures 
in the early twentieth century began to respond to the call for a right to 
privacy.27 While privacy interests took a variety of different forms in the law,28 
one of the strands—which William Prosser later identified as “[a]ppropriation, 
for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”29—reflected 
an early form of the publicity right. The New York privacy statute was typical, 
imposing liability against the unauthorized use of the “name, portrait or picture 
of any living persons” for “advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.”30 
Factually, most of these “commercial appropriation” privacy cases 
involved the unauthorized use of a personal name or photograph in connection 
 
right of property in its widest sense, including all possession, including all rights and 
privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad 
basis on which the protection which the individual demands can be rested.”); see also Corliss 
v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) (“[A] private individual has a right 
to be protected in the representation of his portrait in any form,” and “this is a property as 
well as a personal right.”); cf. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 28 (N.Y. 1895) (Gray, J., 
dissenting) (“I cannot see why the right of privacy is not a form of property, as much as is 
the right of complete immunity in one’s person.”). 
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 215. 
25. Id. at 218 (“The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the 
individual, or with his consent.”). 
26. Id. at 216. 
27. See Madow, supra note 14, at 167-69 (describing the history of the right to 
privacy). 
28. William Prosser identified four different categories of privacy-related torts: (1) 
intrusion into private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts, (3) “false light” 
privacy invasion—that is, publicly presenting a party in a false light, and (4) appropriation of 
a name or likeness for the defendant’s economic advantage. Prosser, supra note 17, at 389. 
More generally, commentators have identified numerous ways in which state and federal law 
recognize privacy interests. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 1335, 1340, 1342-43 (identifying five disparate areas of privacy law, including 
constitutional privacy principles, whose origins trace back to Warren and Brandeis’s article). 
29. Prosser, supra note 17, at 389. 
30. Act of Apr. 6, 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 308 (codified as amended at 
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 2002)). The New York law was passed in 
response to the New York Court of Appeals’ refusal to recognize the privacy right as a 
matter of common law. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 
1902). See generally Madow, supra note 14, at 167 & n.202; Lawrence E. Savell, Right of 
Privacy—Appropriation of a Person’s Name, Portrait, or Picture for Advertising or Trade 
Purposes Without Prior Written Consent: History and Scope in New York, 48 ALB. L. REV. 
1, 3-14 (1983).  
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with product advertising.31 A number of them also included demonstrably false 
statements that would be separately actionable under today’s unfair competition 
laws.32 Despite the fairly narrow factual context of the claims, however, the 
courts tended to describe the new privacy right in extremely broad terms, often 
suggesting a property-like interest of individuals in their personal image.33 At 
the same time, they acknowledged a tension between individuals’ privacy 
interests and the interest of the public in access to information and suggested 
that public figures’ privacy rights would be more limited than those of purely 
private individuals.34 Thus, the cases involving well-known individuals tended 
to involve blatant misrepresentations that could harm their reputations in the 
community.35 The cause of action, in other words, remained deeply rooted in 
 
31. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (upholding 
privacy claim based on use of plaintiff’s photograph in life-insurance advertisement that 
included false statements about his relationship with the insurance company); Kunz v. Allen, 
172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918) (finding violation of right of privacy based on the use of 
clandestinely recorded footage of plaintiff in advertisement for dry-goods store); Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909) (allowing privacy claim when 
defendant had used a false testimonial by plaintiff in its advertisement, stating that “a person 
is entitled to the right of privacy as to his picture, and . . . the publication of the picture of a 
person without his consent, as a part of an advertisement for the purpose of exploiting the 
publisher’s business, is a violation of the right of privacy”); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 
1076 (Mo. App. 1911) (upholding privacy claim based on unauthorized use of child’s 
photograph in advertisement for jewelry); Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 
394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (finding privacy right violation when defendant’s product labels 
included both a picture of Thomas Edison and a false Edison testimonial regarding the 
formula for defendant’s products). 
32. See cases cited supra note 31. 
33. See, e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80 (“If one’s picture may be used by another for 
advertising purposes, it may be reproduced and exhibited anywhere. If it may be used in a 
newspaper, it may be used on a poster or a placard. It may be posted upon the walls of 
private dwellings or upon the streets. It may ornament the bar of the saloon-keeper, or 
decorate the walls of a brothel. By becoming a member of society, neither man nor woman 
can be presumed to have consented to such uses of the impression of their faces and features 
upon paper or upon canvas.”); Munden, 134 S.W. at 1079 (“We therefore conclude that one 
has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its being a property right of material 
profit.”); Edison, 67 A. at 394 (“If a man’s name be his own property . . . it is difficult to 
understand why the peculiar cast of one’s features is not also one’s property, and why its 
pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the person seeking 
to make an unauthorized use of it.”). 
As a theoretical basis for the cause of action, courts generally turned to natural law. See, 
e.g., Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70 (“A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore 
derived from natural law.”). 
34. E.g., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894). 
35. E.g., Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) 
(enjoining use of well-known physician’s name in connection with the sale of medicine, 
reasoning that “[t]he labels were injurious to plaintiff’s professional reputation”); State v. 
Hinkle, 229 P. 317, 319 (Wash. 1924) (The court enjoined unauthorized use of politician’s 
name in connection with a political party, stating that “[n]othing so exclusively belongs to a 
man or is so personal or valuable to him as his name. His reputation and the character he has 
built up are inseparably connected with it.”). 
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offense to person, to acts that caused “pain and mental stress” by stripping 
celebrities of control over their reputations and associational choices. 
The privacy roots of the early identity appropriation claim had several 
implications for celebrities. First, the mere publication of their photographs or 
images was typically not viewed by courts as an invasion of any privacy 
interest, because the celebrities had actively sought out their fame and could 
not be offended by its furtherance.36 Second, while a celebrity could sometimes 
prevail on a theory that the defendant had falsely suggested her endorsement of 
its product, courts generally held that the mere use of the celebrity’s image, 
even in advertising, did not suggest such endorsement.37 Third, even when 
celebrities prevailed in privacy cases, their damages were limited to the 
personal injury that they suffered, rather than the economic value that the use 
brought to the advertiser.38 And finally, since the right of privacy was a 
personal right, it ran with the person and could not be transferred or survive the 
death of the celebrity.39 These limitations led celebrities and their advocates to 
push for a different, more economically oriented right in their personas.40 
 
36. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) 
(“Assuming then, what is by no means clear, that an action for right of privacy would lie in 
Texas at the suit of a private person, we think to [sic] clear that the action fails; because 
plaintiff is not such a person and the publicity he got was only that which he had been 
constantly seeking and receiving.”); Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416, 423 (1926) (refusing to 
enjoin the unauthorized filming of a privately funded Arctic expedition since “as a public 
enterprise in which everybody is interested, and in which the public at large is interested, it 
cannot claim any rights of privacy”); cf. Corliss, 64 F. at 282 (“A private individual should 
be protected against the publication of any portraiture of himself, but where an individual 
becomes a public character the case is different. A statesman, author, artist, or inventor, who 
asks for and desires public recognition, may be said to have surrendered this right to the 
public.”). But see Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d 199, 200 (Sup. Ct. 1939) 
(enjoining sale of locket with actress’s picture inside, without regard to false endorsement, 
when “[t]he photograph was obviously used to bring attention to the lockets on display to 
make them more attractive”). 
37. See Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1935) 
(refusing to allow bat company, which had license to use ballplayers’ signatures on bats, to 
sue competitor that used baseball players’ names to denote style of competing bats); Martin 
v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 1 Ohio Supp. 19, 23 (Com. Pl. 1938) (“An actress of the 
accomplishments and reputation claimed for this plaintiff is no longer a private individual, 
but has become a public character and cannot complain that any right of privacy is 
trespassed upon the mere unauthorized publication of a photograph.”). 
38. Cf. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73 (noting that tort damages, such as “recovery of damages 
for wounded feelings,” are available in right of privacy cases). 
39. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. App. 1931); Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 80 
N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895) (“Death deprives us 
all of rights in the legal sense of that term, and when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own individual 
right of privacy, whatever it may have been, expired at the same time.”). 
40. See, e.g., Recent Cases, 49 HARV. L. REV. 478, 496 (1936) (analyzing Hanna 
Manufacturing Co.). See generally Madow, supra note 14, at 172 (noting that, as a result of 
changes in communication and advertising practices, “some people began to conceive of 
fame as an instrumental good, a business asset like ‘good will,’ a commodity to be produced 
and exchanged like any other”). The dissent in O’Brien v. Pabst planted the seeds for such a 
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B. The Modern View: Fame as Property 
Celebrities frustrated with the right of privacy found their vindication in 
1953, when the Second Circuit decided Haelan v. Topps Chewing Gum.41 The 
case involved competing chewing gum manufacturers that used baseball 
trading cards as a device to help sell their gum. Haelan had obtained exclusive 
licenses from a number of ballplayers authorizing the use of their images on its 
baseball cards. When Topps sold its own gum with photographs of these same 
players,42 Haelan sued for violation of its “exclusive rights” to the players’ 
images.43 
The court agreed with defendant that plaintiff could not recover under New 
York’s statutory privacy law,44 but nonetheless ruled in favor of plaintiff based 
on a new common law right that it dubbed the “right of publicity”: 
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in 
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his 
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without an 
accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.45 
The court gave no doctrinal or policy justification for its decision, offering 
instead a conclusory statement that “New York decisions recognize such a 
right” and citing three cases that did no such thing.46 By way of explanation, 
the court stated merely that:  
[M]any prominent persons . . . would feel sorely deprived if they no longer 
received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their 
 
claim. See 124 F.2d at 171 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It appears [from the complaint] that the 
appellee committed a tort in misappropriating a valuable property right of appellant.”) 
(emphasis added). 
41. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
42. Topps had obtained licenses to use at least some of the photographs from Russell 
Publishing Company, a third party who allegedly induced the players to violate their 
exclusive contract with Haelan. The court noted that the plaintiff would have a cause of 
action for such inducement against Russell, or against Topps in cases in which Topps had 
induced the breach directly or through its agents. Id. at 868. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (referring to the right of privacy as “a personal and non-assignable right not to 
have his feelings hurt by such a publication”). The New York Court of Appeals has since 
held that at least some aspects of the right of publicity properly fall within the right of 
privacy statute. See Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 
1984). 
45. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
46. See id. (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) 
(breach of contract claim); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 7 
N.Y.S.2d 845 (App. Div. 1938) (misappropriation claim based on a movie’s deceptive 
suggestion that it depicted an actual Madison Square Garden hockey game); Liebig’s Extract 
of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 F. 688 (2d Cir. 1910) (granting injunction against 
individual’s use of his own name in trade, based on his prior transfer of trademark rights in 
the name to another party)). 
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countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and 
subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it 
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other 
advertiser from using their pictures.47 
Haelan’s new cause of action differed from the right of privacy in several 
important ways. Most significantly, as an economic rather than a personal right, 
the right of publicity was fully alienable, meaning that third parties could 
acquire a celebrity’s publicity rights and have standing to sue for violations.48 
In some cases, such third parties were profit-oriented assignees concerned with 
maximizing the revenues from the celebrity’s fame, but not necessarily with 
preserving the values of privacy and personal integrity upon which the right of 
privacy so heavily relied. The new emphasis on maximizing celebrities’ 
economic returns also had implications for damages: in addition to injunctive 
relief, celebrities (or their licensees) could now seek damages in the form of 
customary endorsement fees, rather than limiting themselves to the type of 
actual, personal harm contemplated by the right of privacy.49 
At the same time, the Second Circuit’s opinion left open critical questions 
about the content of the new right. In particular, because Haelan itself involved 
a use of images in products, the court did not face the question of whether the 
publicity right applied only in that context or extended to other profit-making 
uses of celebrity identity. Nor did the court determine whether the publicity 
right could survive the death of the celebrity. Indeed, the theoretical vacuum 
through which the court introduced the publicity right left courts with very little 
insight into the values that should guide them as they applied the law to new 
facts.50 While it took a couple of decades for the right of publicity to take 
hold,51 by the late 1970s it had gained traction in both courts and legislatures 
around the country. Unfortunately, rather than fill Haelan’s vacuum with 
considered analysis, judges and lawmakers sidestepped the tough issues and 
 
47. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868. 
48. Indeed, the perceived need for alienability was what drove the recognition of the 
new right in Haelan, because the personal right of privacy would not have allowed Haelan, a 
licensee, to sue. Alienability, of course, increased the value of the right by ensuring that 
exclusive licensees or transferees received the full value of the celebrity’s image. But as 
Melissa Jacoby and Diane Zimmerman point out, it can also reduce the value of the right to 
the celebrity herself, by reducing the control she has over the use of her name. See Melissa 
B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted 
Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002). 
49. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 (1995) 
(stating that damages can include celebrity’s pecuniary loss “or . . . the actor’s own 
pecuniary gain resulting from the appropriation, whichever is greater”). 
50. A year after Haelan, Melvin Nimmer wrote an article defending the new right of 
publicity and attempting to give it some theoretical footing. His explanation for the right—
“that every person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important 
countervailing public policy considerations”—relied upon Lockean labor theory, which 
breaks down under further scrutiny. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
51. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, §§ 1:31, 1:32; Madow, supra note 14, at 176-77 
(discussing history). 
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increasingly adopted an attitude of “if value, then right.”52 
Since Haelan was decided, more than half of the states have adopted some 
form of a right of publicity, either through common law or statute.53 With some 
variation, the laws proscribe any unauthorized use of an individual’s identity 
for commercial purposes or “for purposes of trade.”54 None specifically limits 
the right to advertising, and indeed the Restatement identifies merchandising 
uses as among the uses targeted by the law.55 And while most states historically 
viewed the right as nondescendible, the modern trend holds it capable of 
surviving the death of the celebrity.56 The right of publicity has been applied in 
a wide range of cases: sound-alikes;57 look-alikes;58 use of the celebrity’s 
nickname in a fictional work;59 use of address;60 statues;61 and the use of a 
 
52. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990); cf. Felix Cohen, 
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) 
(discussing trademark law and stating that “[t]he vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is 
plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual 
fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally 
protected”). 
David Westfall and David Landau argue that this expansion may be self-perpetuating: 
“[O]nce an article acquires one of the attributes of property, legal actors will label it property 
and thus it will tend to acquire the other traditional attributes of property as well.” David 
Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 71, 71 (2005). They explain that the right of publicity is one of a number of legal rights 
for which this has occurred. 
53. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 6:3. 
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); cf. 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 4, § 3.2 (“Rather, what is required is proof that the defendant intended to obtain a 
commercial advantage.”). 
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (“The name, likeness, 
and other indicia of a person’s identity are used ‘for purposes of trade’ . . . if they are used in 
advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on merchandise marketed by the user, 
or are used in connection with services rendered by the user.”); see also Brinkley v. 
Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that sale of poster of 
celebrity was a sale “for trade purposes” within the language of the New York privacy 
statute). 
56. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 9:18. 
57. E.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing right of 
publicity claim against advertiser that hired singer to imitate Bette Midler’s voice for use in 
automobile advertisement). 
58. E.g., Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing 
claim by Woody Allen against video-rental company that used Allen impersonator in its 
advertisements); cf. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 
1974) (holding that race-car driver had right of publicity claim against advertiser that used 
footage of his race car in its advertisements, even when the image of the car was modified to 
remove distinctive features and the driver’s personal likeness was not identifiable).  
59. E.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (upholding 
right of publicity claim based on comic book that used hockey player’s nickname, “Tony 
Twist,” as the name of a fictional character in the book). 
60. Villalovos v. Sundance Assocs., No. 01 C 8468, 2003 WL 115243, at *2-5 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 13, 2003) (recognizing privacy and publicity claims by noncelebrity against 
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robot that barely resembles the celebrity but evokes her image.62 The only 
internal limitation of the right lies in the meaning of “for purposes of trade” or 
“commercial purposes.” And while some courts have incorporated First 
Amendment principles into their definition of “commercial,” limiting 
commercial use of a personality to cases in which the celebrity is advertising or 
otherwise helping to sell the product,63 others apply a broad meaning of that 
term, concluding that any use of a name or likeness by which anyone makes 
money is therefore “commercial.” 
C. Problem Cases: Referential Uses and Merchandise 
The apparently absolute nature of the right to prevent commercial uses, 
together with the breadth of the term “commercial,” means that courts often 
presume a violation from any use of celebrity identity, with the defendant 
bearing the burden of establishing that its use was protected by the First 
Amendment or some other limiting doctrine. 
Two types of cases are particularly troubling: those involving the sale of 
merchandise bearing a celebrity likeness and those involving reference to (but 
no direct use of) the celebrity’s identity in advertisements. 
1. Merchandising 
Merchandising involves the use of celebrity image, not merely as a device 
to draw attention to a standalone product, but as an integral part of the product 
itself. Artists depict celebrities in posters, t-shirts, buttons, and other consumer 
products, and consumers buy them, not because they think the celebrity 
endorsed the product,64 but because they admire the celebrity and seek to 
 
pornographic magazine that published her name and address in connection with a lewd 
advertisement based, in part, on the conclusion that “[a] valid address may identify a person 
more specifically than just a name, which often identifies not just one but several people”). 
61. E.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (“[T]he appropriation of another’s name and likeness, 
whether such likeness be a photograph or sculpture, without consent and for the financial 
gain of the appropriator is a tort in Georgia.”). 
62. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
that, by evoking Vanna White’s image, advertiser had appropriated her identity within the 
meaning of California’s right of publicity law). See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, §§ 
4:45-4:87 (summarizing forms of identity appropriation that courts have found to violate the 
right of publicity). 
63. E.g., Valentine v. CBS, Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 433 (11th Cir. 1983); Lane v. MRA 
Holdings, 242 F. Supp. 3d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 
2d 802 (Fla. 2005). “Commercial speech” in the First Amendment sense is speech that does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980). 
64. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (“No 
reasonable person could believe that merely because these photographs or paintings contain 
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associate themselves with her. 
Merchandising cases differ from the traditional advertising-use cases in 
two important ways. First, they rarely raise the same concerns about celebrities’ 
loss of personal integrity as the advertising cases do. When I sell an adulatory t-
shirt bearing a picture of Tiger Woods, I do not threaten his control over the 
meaning associated with his persona by suggesting his endorsement of some 
product, service, or business; to the contrary, I am validating and reinforcing 
the allure of the image that he himself has seen fit to convey to the public.65 
Second, the merchandising cases involve important countervailing interests on 
the part of those who make and buy the merchandise. Unlike advertising uses, 
which employ celebrity identities purely to “propose a commercial 
transaction,”66 merchandising uses adopt the celebrity image as an aesthetic 
element of the product itself.67 Buyers have an interest in accessing these 
images to show their admiration of and affiliation with cultural icons. Sellers 
often have their own expressive interest in presenting the celebrity image 
through their own artistic lens. Giving celebrities control over these uses of 
their images also has important economic consequences, impeding competition 
in the markets for such merchandise.68 
 
[Tiger] Woods’s likeness or image, they all originated with Woods.”). In some situations, the 
context of the sale, together with the nature of the product, may cause consumers to believe 
that the celebrity endorsed the product. Nothing in the cases or literature, however, suggests 
that people assume such endorsement generally, or even that confusion as to endorsement is 
a relevant consideration in right of publicity cases. 
65. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” 
Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against 
Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 62 (2003-04) (“[T]o the extent that 
the right of publicity protects against appropriation of the associative value of one’s 
persona—the enhanced value to another product or service—it should not be considered 
violated by the sale of an image itself.”). 
66. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001) 
(finding posters and t-shirts “expressive works and not an advertisement for or endorsement 
of a product”). 
67. Thomas McCarthy endorses a categorical approach that denies any First 
Amendment consideration to sellers of celebrity merchandise. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, 
§ 7:20 (“Utilitarian merchandise is not the common medium for socially significant 
‘messages.’”). But see Dougherty, supra note 65, at 70 (contending that merchandise should 
receive full First Amendment protection, in part because “[t]here is no way to express an 
opinion or an emotion or to convey information about a celebrity without identifying that 
celebrity”). Dougherty clearly has the right side in this debate. While there is certainly 
celebrity merchandise that conveys no message at all, it is easy to think of celebrity 
merchandise that conveys a very clear political message. If “Fuck the Draft” is protected 
speech, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), why should “Screw Khomeini” (a 
bumper sticker for sale during the 1980 Iran hostage crisis) be any different? Further, even 
uses that don’t include an explicit message about the celebrity are still communicating 
support for, attraction to, or irony concerning that individual—all speech of the sort the First 
Amendment protects. 
68. Of course, competition may suffer only if a particular celebrity image is 
sufficiently popular to give its exclusive licensee power over price. But the vigor with which 
celebrities litigate merchandise claims suggests that they think they are getting some 
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The problem is even worse when people use a celebrity’s name or image in 
ways that are critical of the celebrity. It is unreasonable to expect that an 
individual will license to another the right to criticize or make fun of him.69 
And there is no question that such parodies and critiques are precisely the sort 
of speech we want to encourage. While one could say that the celebrity is 
losing control over his identity, few would suggest that the right of publicity 
should give celebrities that much control. A strong version of the 
merchandising right would prevent these desirable uses. 
Courts have by and large disregarded these concerns in merchandising 
cases. While they have recognized speech interests in cases involving news 
reporting, biography, film, and certain forms of art,70 most courts dismiss any 
suggestion that the sale of celebrity-oriented merchandise brings a public 
benefit that should weigh into the balance in analyzing right of publicity 
claims. Even when they give lip service to speech concerns, they generally find 
them insufficient to counter the interest of celebrities in protecting their 
identities. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Comedy III Productions, Inc. 
v. Gary Saderup, Inc.71 is illustrative. Gary Saderup, an artist specializing in 
charcoal sketches of celebrities, sold t-shirts and posters featuring his drawing 
of the Three Stooges. When the assignee of the deceased actors’ right of 
publicity filed suit, Saderup defended on the ground that the t-shirts were art 
protected by the First Amendment. While the court gave a good deal of 
attention to the First Amendment argument,72 it ultimately found it wanting. 
The method the court chose for addressing Saderup’s speech interests typifies 
the skeptical attitude of courts toward celebrity merchandise. After considering 
a variety of possible approaches to the First Amendment concerns, the court 
settled on a “transformative use test” modeled loosely on the first factor of 
copyright fair use analysis:73 
Another way of stating the inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of 
the “raw materials” from which an original work is synthesized, or whether 
the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the 
 
economic value out of such control. 
69. It is for this reason that copyright law generally treats parodies as fair use. See, 
e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); cf. Robert P. Merges, Are 
You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 
AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
67, 71 (1992) (suggesting that parody should be protected up to the point that it serves as a 
market substitute for the original). 
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (“[U]se ‘for 
purposes of trade’ does not ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news 
reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is 
incidental to such uses.”). 
71. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
72. Id. at 802-11. 
73. See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text. 
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work in question. We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And when we 
use the word “expression,” we mean expression of something other than the 
likeness of the celebrity.74 
As Jay Dougherty has persuasively argued,75 the transformative use test “is 
a slender, effervescent wall to protect freedom of expression” in the 
merchandising context.76 It will arguably protect most parodies and other 
critical uses of celebrity identities and may insulate some artistic portrayals that 
radically alter the celebrity’s look.77 But for portrayals that seek accuracy 
rather than distortion, that seek to pay tribute rather than to criticize, the 
transformative use test will rarely provide a defense against a right of publicity 
claim. 
The Saderup court and others like it, then, essentially establish a 
presumption that celebrities have an absolute right to the economic value of 
their identity, subject only to special First Amendment concerns that will rarely 
apply in a merchandising case. The courts, in other words, assume the 
legitimacy of a potent right of publicity that will generally outweigh any speech 
interests of sellers or buyers of celebrity merchandise. As we discuss below, 
there is good reason to question that assumption and to demand that courts tie 
the right of publicity more directly to an identifiable normative goal before 
attempting to balance the relative interests of the celebrity and the public in 
merchandising cases. 
2. Evocation 
A second type of problematic case is one in which an advertiser evokes, 
without directly employing, a celebrity identity for commercial purpose. In the 
classic example, Vanna White won a suit against Samsung for running an ad 
that featured a robot turning letters on the Wheel of Fortune set.78 While 
 
74. Saderup, 21 P.3d at 809 (emphasis added). 
75. Dougherty, supra note 65. 
76. Id. at 32; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 913-25 (2003) (criticizing transformative use test as inadequate to 
protect speech interests in right of publicity cases). 
77. The court offered Andy Warhol’s silkscreens as the type of celebrity portrayals 
that “may well” satisfy the transformative test. See Saderup, 21 P.3d at 811 (“Through 
distortion and the careful manipulation of context, Warhol was able to convey a message that 
went beyond the commercial exploitation of celebrity images and became a form of ironic 
social comment on the dehumanization of celebrity itself.”). But in fact there is little 
difference between Warhol’s depictions and Saderup’s, except that Warhol is already a 
recognized artist. Were he working as a beginning artist today and sued by the estate of 
Marilyn Monroe, it is likely that he would lose a right of publicity case under the California 
Supreme Court standard. 
78. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). For a fuller 
discussion of White and other cases involving evocation of celebrity identity, see Stacey L. 
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acknowledging that Samsung did not directly make use of White’s name or 
likeness, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that her allegations supported a 
right of publicity claim. “The right of publicity,” the court held, “does not 
require that appropriations of identity be accomplished through particular 
means to be actionable.”79 Indeed, by limiting the right to particular types of 
appropriation, “we would not only weaken the right but effectively eviscerate 
it” because “[t]he identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the 
most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to 
obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice.”80 By evoking White’s image, 
the court held, Samsung had exploited the value of White’s celebrity, and 
therefore it should pay.81 
As we have discussed elsewhere, a strong evocation right comes at a 
significant cost to the public.82 Speakers have an interest in evoking common 
cultural symbols to convey themes or ideas uniquely associated with them.83 
Even if it makes sense to limit advertisers’ use of particular, identifiable 
features of a celebrity’s persona, extending the right of publicity beyond those 
concrete features will inevitably chill speech. Advertisers may well avoid 
themes, dress, or décor that a particular celebrity has popularized, for fear of 
raising her ire. Celebrities or their families may seek to stop portrayals they 
don’t like in movies, books, or the media.84 And the owners of legitimate IP 
rights—such as television programmers—may hesitate to license their content 
for fear that one of their actors will sue.85 The problem is exacerbated when the 
image the celebrity seeks to appropriate is created in whole or in part by 
another, as in the Wendt and White cases. The personality the court assigns to 
the celebrity in those cases is not simply the celebrity’s own image, but an 
amalgam of the contributions of writers, cinematographers, and fellow actors. 
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in White resembles the rationale of the 
merchandising cases in an important way. In both situations, the courts appear 
to be assuming that celebrities have a presumptive entitlement to the economic 
 
Dogan, An Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 303-08 (2003). 
79. White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
80. Id. at 1399. 
81. Id.; see also Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 
2000) (announcing that the right of publicity “is now generally understood to cover anything 
that suggests the plaintiff’s personal identity”). 
82. See Dogan, supra note 78, at 316-18. 
83. Id. at 316. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 52, at 397. 
84. See, e.g., Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965) (suit by the 
heirs of Al Capone seeking to stop the making of The Untouchables); Chris Newton, 
Lubbock Can’t Use Holly Name in Music Festival, Widow Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, 
June 18, 1999, at B11 (noting Buddy Holly’s heirs objecting to the use of his name on a 
music festival). 
85. E.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing right of 
publicity claim by “Cheers” actors against airport bar that acquired a license from the 
“Cheers” copyright holder to feature the show’s characters as part of its décor). 
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value of their personas and a right to complain about any use that captures part 
of that economic value, unless some special First Amendment considerations 
apply. The outcome of both types of cases depends critically upon the 
correctness of that assumption, because any change in the weight of the 
celebrities’ interests must affect the overall balance between the interests of 
celebrities and the interests of those who would like to use—or to buy—their 
identities in products and ads. We turn, then, to the theoretical justifications for 
a strong, property-like right of publicity. 
II. THE USUAL EXPLANATIONS 
Commentators, and those courts that have chosen to consider the question, 
have cast about for years for a persuasive justification for the publicity right.86 
The need for a normative account is critical, not only to explain why we have 
the right, but also to understand its scope and weigh it against the kinds of 
competing concerns discussed above. Most of the explanations offered fall into 
one of three categories: the moral or natural rights story; the exhaustion or 
allocative-efficiency account; and the incentive-based rationale. In recent years, 
the incentive-based rationale has increasingly taken hold, with courts and 
commentators looking to copyright law in an attempt to validate and give shape 
to the publicity right. While each of these explanations has some superficial 
appeal, they all break down under scrutiny.87 In this Part, we briefly discuss the 
problems with the moral and allocative-efficiency explanations and then 
explain why the current gravitation toward copyright law is both misguided and 
troubling.88 
A. Moral Rights 
A moral rights thread has always run through the right of publicity. To 
some extent, this inevitably results from the law’s roots in the right to privacy, 
which an early court described as “recognized intuitively, consciousness being 
the witness that can be called to establish its existence.”89 Courts consistently 
 
86. Some have given up, concluding that “the right of publicity is both hard to object to 
and hard to support. It is then pointless to debate in general terms whether the right ought to 
exist at all.” Westfall & Landau, supra note 52, at 122. We are inclined to agree with them 
that focusing on the contours of the right is more productive, and indeed that is what we 
attempt in the balance of this Article, though we think that cannot effectively be done 
without some understanding of why the right exists in the first place. 
87. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995) 
(questioning existing rationales for the right of publicity). 
88. Numerous scholars have written comprehensive and persuasive critiques of each of 
these theories, and we offer only an abridged version here. For more thorough examinations, 
see Dougherty, supra note 65, at 62-71; Madow, supra note 14, at 178-238; McKenna, supra 
note 8. 
89. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905); see also id. (“A 
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viewed the privacy right as a kind of moral imperative, a liberty interest against 
“manifest unfairness,”90 to which individuals had an absolute entitlement as 
private citizens. 
The transition from personal-tort-based right of privacy to economically 
oriented right of publicity, however, required a shift in the nature—if not an 
abandonment—of the moral imperative. While courts and commentators 
continued to rely upon moral rights reasoning,91 their rationale changed from a 
theory of personal liberty to a labor-based moral right. In particular, they turned 
to the flip sides of the Lockean coin: the asserted right to the fruits of one’s 
labor and protection against unjust enrichment. The celebrity, the argument 
goes, has rights to the fruits of her labor and, at the very least, has the right to 
prevent others from taking those fruits for their own personal gain. 
As others have pointed out,92 however, neither the labor nor the unjust 
enrichment theory can support a right of publicity that reserves to a celebrity all 
the economic value of her identity. From a labor perspective, the value of a 
celebrity persona rarely owes itself exclusively—or even primarily—to the 
efforts of the celebrity. Others—writers who craft the celebrity’s dramatic 
roles,93 agents who pluck her from obscurity, studios and marketing directors 
who shape her public image, even devotees who fan the flames of her 
popularity—play a role in creating the value of a celebrity. Given the lack of 
direct relation between celebrity labor and celebrity value, it makes little sense 
to assign the full economic value of the persona to the celebrity based on a 
labor rights theory. 
Nor can a theory of human dignity justify the right of publicity. Even 
assuming that human dignity includes the right to prevent people from making 
true statements about you to sell a commercial product,94 it fits uneasily with a 
 
right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore derived from natural law.”). 
90. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right 
Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 873 (1995). 
91. See, e.g., id. at 871; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1, 57 (1997); J. 
Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity, 19 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 140-41 (1995). 
92. See sources cited supra note 88. 
93. E.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving 
conflict between creators of “Cheers” series and actors who played characters in the series). 
94. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 989 (1964). 
A human dignity approach may well support a more narrowly drawn right of publicity 
focused on uses that falsely suggest celebrity endorsement of commercial products. E.g., 
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing a claim by Tom Waits 
against Frito-Lay for sound-alike advertisement that suggested Waits’s endorsement of 
Dorito product). See generally Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First 
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 73 (1994) (“Waits’ 
feelings of anger and embarrassment were particularly pronounced given his strong public 
stand against doing any type of commercial endorsements.”). This approach, which harkens 
back to the early right of publicity cases, recognizes both the economic and reputational 
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right of publicity that is only rarely about preventing such uses and almost 
always about maximizing the celebrity’s profit from them.95 The fact that 
people who claim ownership rights over their personalities are willing to sell 
their dignity for a fairly low price in many cases96 should make us skeptical of 
a claim that this is really a form of paternalism designed at protecting 
individuals from commercialization. It may in fact have the opposite effect: as 
David Troutt warns, “unchecked propertization portends a diminution of 
personal identity.”97 
The unjust enrichment argument98 fares no better. The moral claim for 
ownership of publicity rights presumes that someone must have property rights 
in the value of a celebrity persona.99 If that presumption is correct, then it 
might make sense to assign rights to the celebrity rather than some third party. 
But before assigning property rights in this way, we should test the basic 
presumption that property rights are appropriate in the first place. The very 
existence of a right, in other words, requires some justification: in a market 
economy it is not reasonable to simply assume that someone must own the right 
to compete in particular ways.100 But the unjust enrichment rationale makes 
 
injury that can result from the false association of a celebrity with commercial products that 
she did not endorse. It does not, however, justify the current form of the right of publicity, 
which has in fact moved away from concerns about human dignity and toward maximization 
of economic returns. And it is worth noting that such a dignitary claim would largely parallel 
the scope of the right justified by the search-cost rationale. 
95. See Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 48, at 1322 (noting that the right of 
publicity is treated as a property rather than a personal right); Richard A. Posner, The Right 
of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978) (noting that an alienable property right would be 
a strange response to problems with commercialization of identity). 
96. For example, students have sold their bodies to banks for use as billboards and 
tattooed logos onto their skin. See, e.g., David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of the Trademark as 
a Black Man: Intellectual Property, Commodification, and Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1141, 1143-44 (2005) (describing these instances). 
97. Id. at 1146. 
98. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:2; Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966). 
99. For critiques of this assumption, see Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, 
supra note 11, at 478-81 (critiquing unjust enrichment justification for merchandising rights 
in the trademark context); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 144-47 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante]; 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free 
Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & 
POL’Y 283, 307 (2000) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Pants]. 
100. As Ralph Brown put it, “competition is copying.” Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of 
Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 477, 481 (1983); see also Robert C. Denicola, Freedom 
To Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1661 (1999) (“[L]aws that restrain copying . . . restrain 
competition.”). See generally Peter Jaffey, Merchandising and the Law of Trade Marks, 3 
INTELL. PROP. Q. 240 (1998) (noting that trademark law does not support a general 
merchandising right). 
Alice Haemmerli advocates a Kantian approach to the publicity right. Alice Haemmerli, 
Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383 (1999). But 
Haemmerli, too, falls victim to the erroneous assumption that someone must have rights in 
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just such an assumption. As such, it fails to provide a standalone explanation 
for the publicity right. 
The labor and unjust enrichment rationales also fail to explain uses that the 
law treats as beyond the celebrity’s control. If a celebrity has a right to 
appropriate the full value of her persona and to prevent others from profiting 
from the use of her name, that right logically would seem to extend to control 
over references in the for-profit news media, documentaries, biographies, and a 
variety of other creative works to which the right of publicity does not extend 
even today. A moral rights theory needs to be able to explain not just why we 
grant certain rights, but also why we don’t grant others.101 
Indeed, we can just as easily imagine a moral entitlement claim to be free 
from right of publicity claims.102 Such an argument would run something like 
this: In a free society, people have a right to make truthful statements about 
other people, at least so long as those statements don’t invade another’s 
privacy.103 Further, in a capitalist economy, people should not be punished for 
making money from something they have a right to do. A right of publicity 
interferes with this fundamental moral right and is therefore unjustified. We 
make this argument not to demonstrate its truth, but to demonstrate the ultimate 
indeterminacy of claims based on moral right. How is a court to choose 
between “blind appeals” to these competing moral principles?104 
One way a court might do so is to look to social norms of behavior as 
dictating morality. But here the moral entitlement claim for publicity rights 
 
an individual’s persona:  
As to whether a person should be able to claim a property right in the use of her objectified 
identity, there is no logical reason why she should not and every reason why she should: if 
one’s own image, for example, is treated as an object capable of “being yours or mine,” why 
should it not be claimed by the person who is its natural source?  
Id. at 418 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Haemmerli bases her justification for the 
right of publicity on human autonomy, but she offers no reason to privilege the autonomy of 
the celebrity protected by the right of publicity over the autonomy of speakers such a right 
would curtail. 
101. See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 109 (1994) (noting that unjust enrichment approaches cannot 
explain limits on liability). One might view the moral rights theory as normative rather than 
descriptive, and argue that the failure to give celebrities control over their portrayal in the 
news media is an oversight that needs to be rectified. But if so, moral rights theorists need to 
be forthright about the consequences of their approach. 
102. See, e.g., Madow, supra note 14, at 138-46 (describing speech interests of those 
who make use of celebrity images). 
103. This right has been contested at various times in history. See, e.g., Lawrence 
Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 961 (noting claims in the early 
days of the camera that no one could take another’s picture without permission). 
Nonetheless, it seems well established as a general moral proposition today, at least in the 
United States. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(refusing to recognize a right to control sale of mailing list including personal name); 
Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (same). 
104. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (rejecting “blind appeals to first principles” in the right of publicity). 
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runs into a more serious problem. A broad right of publicity runs counter to 
historical assumptions and social norms in the United States and around the 
world. Throughout history, artists and commentators have invoked, interpreted, 
and merchandised famous countenances without repercussion.105 And with 
good reason: such uses promote important speech interests of both the speaker 
and recipients of the information. Ironically enough, to the extent a moral norm 
against such practices is evolving, it is deriving directly from United States 
law.106 This makes it doubly important that United States courts think critically 
about the theoretical basis for this evolving social norm and set the right of 
publicity on a coherent, defensible course. 
B. Allocative Efficiency 
While most courts have relied on moral rights or incentive-based theories, 
a set of economic commentators increasingly relies on an allocative-efficiency 
argument to support the right of publicity. This is a slight modification of the 
classic tragedy of the commons argument: unless we centralize control over 
valuable resources such as fame, they will suffer from overuse and ultimately 
lose all their value.107 
Despite its superficial appeal, however, the commons argument breaks 
down in the context of information markets, such as markets in personal 
images.108 Certainly, granting exclusive rights over celebrity images will 
reduce the use of those images, increase their price, and therefore make more 
money for the rights-holders.109 But as a general matter, such underproduction 
 
105. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, BRAND NAME BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND 
CONTROL CULTURE 131 (2005) (noting that Benjamin Franklin and other Framers did not 
object to the use of their images for commercial purposes).  
106. Traditionally there has been no right of publicity in Commonwealth countries. 
See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, §§ 6:155-6:156. European scholars frequently look to 
United States law as a model for publicity rights law. See, e.g., Klink, supra note 5, at 387 
(“[Fifty] years of daily practice have proven the advantages of separate publicity rights in the 
United States.”). 
107. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 101, at 110-26 (arguing that a right of publicity is 
necessary to coordinate a market for a celebrity’s name and prevent rent dissipation through 
overuse); cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 485 (2003) (claiming that one justification for the right of publicity is 
“to prevent the premature exhaustion of the commercial value of the celebrity’s name or 
likeness”). 
108. Lemley has developed this argument fully in Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 99, and 
portions of this Part are adapted from that article. 
109. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (1962) 
(“[I]nventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely 
to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilitzation of the information.”); Harold 
Smith Reeves, Property in Cyberspace, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 785 (1996) (“With respect to 
informational resources, then, the existence of any legal boundaries will decrease the 
potential availability of informational resources on the Internet.”). Empirical research has 
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and owner enrichment are anathema to competition in a market economy. 
Restricting access to information goods makes sense if, but only if, the 
information would in fact be underproduced or overdistributed in the absence 
of a property right. In other words, the commons-based justification for the 
right of publicity depends on proof that there is in fact a tragedy of the 
commons in celebrity images. 
As Lemley has pointed out elsewhere, however, the basic notion of a 
tragedy of the information commons rests on a flawed understanding of the 
nature of information. Unlike finite natural resources, which can be depleted by 
overuse, information is what economists call nonrivalrous:110 it simply cannot 
be “used up.”111 To the contrary, the proliferation of celebrity images—like the 
distribution of other forms of information—only extends the reach of the 
images, making them more available to those who wish to use and enjoy them. 
And these people’s use and enjoyment causes positive externalities that have 
ripple effects throughout the economy.112 An individual baseball card might be 
worth more money if cards of that player were deliberately made rare, and so 
sellers (or more likely resellers) of that card might increase their total profit. 
But do we really think society as a whole would be better off if only one 
company could make baseball cards and only rich adults could obtain cards 
featuring famous baseball players?  
In the right of publicity context, advocates of the commons argument have 
taken a slightly different tack. Rather than arguing that the celebrity image 
itself will be depleted by overuse, some courts and commentators worry that 
 
indeed shown some evidence that the growth in the right of publicity reduced the willingness 
of advertisers to use celebrity endorsements, presumably by raising the price and the risk 
associated with marginal uses. See Tom Bellamore, Is Vanna White Really So Dangerous? 
An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of White v. Samsung Electronics on Parody and 
Advertising, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 53, 82-94 (2003). 
110. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 16 (3d ed. 2003); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (1989). 
111. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1191-92 
(1998); Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public 
Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003). 
112. See Reeves, supra note 109, at 785. “The result is that rather than a tragedy, an 
information commons is a ‘comedy’ in which everyone benefits.” Lemley, Ex Ante, supra 
note 99, at 143; see also BOLLIER, supra note 105, at 36 (collecting references to the 
“comedy” or “cornucopia” or “inverse” commons that occurs with nondepletable 
information); Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182-83 (2003) (suggesting that it is waste by 
underuse rather than depletion by overuse with which intellectual property theorists should 
be concerned). See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, 
and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986) (developing notion of “the 
comedy of the commons” to describe situations in which increased public access to a 
resource causes positive externalities that bring an overall benefit to society). 
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the value of the image to its owner will decline with overuse.113 Yet this 
instinct, too, is at base anti-market. In a market economy, we hope and expect 
that competing producers will increase their production until prices drop to 
marginal cost.114 It defies logic to set policy goals that aim to insulate 
producers from this very form of competition. We might have to accept such a 
market distortion if we thought that the control we granted over price would 
encourage new creation, as we believe in patent and copyright law, but there is 
no such justification for the right of publicity. 
C. Incentive Models and Copyright 
A final justification offered for the right of publicity is that the grant of 
such control is needed to encourage investment in the development of a public 
persona. This theory is related to the efficiency claim discussed in the last Part, 
but while that argument focused on efficient management after the fact, the 
incentive claim focuses on efficient efforts to create a persona ex ante. In recent 
decades, defenders of publicity rights have increasingly gravitated toward this 
incentive model, often borrowing directly from copyright law.115 The Supreme 
Court ushered in this trend in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,116 
its first and only decision addressing a right of publicity claim. Zacchini 
involved a performer’s publicity claim against a television news broadcaster 
that taped and aired footage of his entire act. The Court held that Ohio’s 
recognition of a right of publicity claim in the case did not offend the First 
Amendment, because of the important state interest in preserving performers’ 
incentives: 
[T]he State’s interest in permitting a “right of publicity” is in protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such 
entertainment. . . . [T]he State’s interest is closely analogous to the goals of 
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the 
 
113. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing this argument). But cf. 
Dogan, supra note 78 (pointing out that celebrities may have incentives to optimize their 
uses regardless of the rights we grant them to control the uses of others). 
114. Lemley explains: 
Economists have a term for markets in which different providers keep selling goods with less 
and less value until the point is reached where it would cost more to produce a good than the 
public is willing to pay for it. We call such a market “perfectly competitive,” and we have 
thought for at least three centuries (since Adam Smith) that it is a good thing. 
Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 99, at 144. 
115. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 
2001) (“The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that 
society deems to have some social utility.”); Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair 
Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 812 (1988) 
(“[C]opyright is the proper analogy for defining the scope of publicity rights.”); Tina J. Ham, 
Note, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use Doctrine—Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543 (2003); Kevin S. Marks, Comment, An 
Assessment of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV. 786 (1982). 
116. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
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reward of his endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or 
reputation.117  
Zacchini was probably the right of publicity case closest in nature to 
common law copyright, since the defendant took not just an image or identity 
but an entire performance.118 Since Zacchini, courts have looked to copyright 
principles both to justify the right of publicity and to strike a balance between 
the interests of celebrities and the public. As justification, courts contend that 
the right of publicity promotes investment in creative work much in the way 
that copyright law promotes investment in original expression.119 As a 
balancing mechanism, courts look to copyright’s fair use doctrine, in whole or 
in part, to accommodate the competing interests of celebrities and those who 
would like to use their personas in some form of speech. In Saderup, for 
example, the California Supreme Court opted against a wholesale importation 
of fair use in the right of publicity context, but viewed one factor—the 
transformative nature of the use—as clearly relevant:  
When artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a 
celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity 
without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law 
interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive 
interests of the imitative artist.120 
The copyright analogy, however, is both misleading and dangerous. First, 
and most importantly, the economic rationale for copyright law—that market 
failure would occur in the absence of the legal right—simply does not apply in 
the right of publicity context.121 As Diane Zimmerman points out, “[n]ot a 
shred of empirical data exists to show that [celebrities] would . . . invest less 
energy and talent” in becoming famous without a publicity right,122 particularly 
since the law provides protection primarily to those who are “already 
 
117. Id. at 573; see also id. at 576 (“[The right of publicity] provides an economic 
incentive for [a performer] to make the investment required to produce a performance of 
interest to the public.”). 
118. We are indebted to Paul Goldstein for this point. 
119. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Saderup, 21 P.3d at 805. But see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 
95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Thus, while publicity rights may provide some incentive 
for creativity and achievement, the magnitude and importance of that incentive has been 
exaggerated.”). 
120. Saderup, 21 P.3d at 808 (footnote omitted). 
121. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992). 
122. Zimmerman, Pants, supra note 99, at 306; see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining 
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 43-44 (2004) (offering 
multiple reasons why a right of publicity isn’t necessary to create incentives to fame); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying 
Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
123, 144 (1996); Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 634 
(2003) (dismissing the incentive story, but endorsing the congestion/overuse story). 
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handsomely compensated” and for whom additional protection is unlikely to 
provide much marginal incentive.123 Even if celebrities would make such an 
additional investment, it is not at all clear that society should want to encourage 
fame for fame’s sake.124 Unlike copyright law—which aims to promote the 
production of valuable works of authorship that enhance the quality of 
discourse and understanding in our society—the right of publicity rewards 
those who, with luck, hard work, or accident of birth, happen to join the ranks 
of the famous.125 Because the right of publicity does not encourage the 
production of any identifiable value, the copyright analogy cannot support the 
right.126 
The problems with the analogy only intensify when courts map specific 
copyright doctrines into right of publicity cases. For example, courts and 
commentators often seek to apply copyright’s fair use doctrine to the right of 
publicity.127 The fair use doctrine in copyright law is designed to balance two 
specific (if elusive) values: the need to preserve incentives for creative 
expression and the need for the public to access and employ existing expressive 
works in speech-enhancing ways. The structure of fair use analysis attempts 
(albeit imperfectly) to weigh these competing values in the context of a 
particular act of copying. It makes sense, at least in theory, to compare the 
relative import of a copier’s contributions against the impact that such copying 
might have on the production of future creative works. In the right of publicity 
context, the flaws in the utilitarian model make the analogous equation 
nonsensical. How can a court evaluate whether a particular use of celebrity 
identity is likely to have a negative impact on future incentives for celebrities to 
invest in their creative activity, given the complete absence of a proven 
incentive relationship in the first place? 
 
123. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. 
124. Cf. Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 111, 120 (1980) (arguing that celebrity endorsements may have a “net 
social disutility”). 
125. See McKenna, supra note 8. 
126. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:6 (“The right of publicity in such 
instances must find support in other rationales . . . .”). 
127. See, e.g., Saderup, 21 P.3d at 807-08; Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity 
Versus Free Speech in Advertising: Some Counterpoints to Professor McCarthy, 18 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 604 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: 
Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. 
REV. 836, 915 (1983) (proposing a “slightly modified version of the fair use copyright 
doctrine” for the right of publicity); Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the 
First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 
1206-07 (1978); Douglas J. Ellis, Comment, The Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment: A Comment on Why Celebrity Parodies Are Fair Game for Fair Use, 64 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 575, 612 (1996). But see Kwall, supra note 94, at 58 (rejecting copyright’s fair 
use framework); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of 
Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 191, 232 (1983) (noting problems with applying 
copyright’s fair use analysis).  
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Rather than persuading courts to abandon the analogy to copyright and fair 
use, these snags have led courts to borrow only some, but not all, of the fair use 
factors in right of publicity cases. The Saderup court, for example, chose the 
first fair use factor, making everything turn on the transformative nature of the 
defendant’s use.128 But such an approach ignores the fact that the fair use 
calculus reflects a subtle and complex balancing of multiple interests that 
makes sense only in combination. Even nontransformative uses, for example, 
should be given free rein when they pose little threat to copyright incentives.129 
Absent some parallel analysis of the effect of a use on the core values of right 
of publicity law, the fair use analogy loses its balance and becomes 
affirmatively misleading. 
Even if we could map a fair use counterpart for the right of publicity, it is 
not at all clear that we would do well to look to copyright as our model. Despite 
its rational roots and facially balanced ambitions, copyright’s fair use doctrine 
has morphed into a largely incoherent area of law that hardly deserves 
emulation.130 And courts have used the existence of this doctrine to justify a 
hands-off approach to copyright law under the First Amendment, leading to a 
skewed balance in favor of copyright holders and against free speech.131 The 
use of concepts such as “transformative use” inevitably leads courts to engage 
in content-based analysis, favoring certain types of speech over others without 
any compelling justification. The California Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
relative artistic value of Gary Saderup’s charcoal sketches as compared to 
Andy Warhol’s “transformative” art is but one example.132 To the extent that 
copyright’s fair use doctrine has led to such value-laden balancing, speech 
concerns should lead courts to resist exporting it into the right of publicity 
context. 
The copyright analogy, in short, fails to support the right of publicity and 
leads to a skewed and inaccurate portrayal of the relative interests of celebrities 
and the public.133 Like the moral rights and allocative-efficiency explanations, 
 
128. Saderup, 21 P.3d at 808; see also Winter v. D.C. Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 475 (Cal. 
2003). 
129. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
130. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 8:38 (“[T]he copyright concept of ‘fair use’ is one 
of the last places to look to find clarity and predictability.”); Dougherty, supra note 65, at 28; 
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1991). 
But see Coyne, supra note 115, at 814-15 (arguing that the copyright model will “inject 
uniformity and predictability” into the right of publicity, a claim of which we are skeptical). 
131. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); 
cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark 
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 150-51 (2005) (contending that the constitutional roots of 
copyright law explain its general immunity from First Amendment scrutiny, and that this 
hands-off approach will not extend into the trademark context). 
132. See supra note 77. 
133. It may present another problem as well—copyright preemption. Federal copyright 
law generally preempts state rights equivalent to copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
DOGAN & LEMLEY 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 3/15/2006 8:00:36 PM 
1190 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1161 
it ultimately fails to explain or justify the existing form of publicity right. 
III. TRADEMARK LAW: A BETTER ANALOGY 
To date, then, a reasonable and persuasive justification for the right of 
publicity has been sorely lacking. The usual rationales—moral rights, allocative 
efficiency, and incentives—provide inadequate support for any right of 
publicity, let alone the current muscular form of the right. And while the 
historic justification of protecting privacy is a perfectly legitimate justification, 
it does not actually support the right in its current scope.134 Courts and 
commentators variously cite each of these justifications but do not (and 
arguably cannot) apply them in any consistent way. Worse, they often simply 
assume an unassailable right of publicity, without even considering whether the 
right as they have defined it promotes any legitimate policy goal. 
Yet there is a compelling explanation for a right of publicity, albeit one that 
differs quite substantially from the scope of the right as it currently exists. The 
structure and content of trademark law provide a theoretical justification for a 
bounded right of publicity.135 Trademark law offers a far better lens than 
copyright law with which to understand what is going on in the right of 
publicity cases. It also offers what previous theories have not—a reason to 
protect publicity rights. Trademark law isn’t perfect, but it is coherent. More 
important, it is by far the closest analogy to the right of publicity. Both laws are 
concerned not with the encouragement of new creation, like other forms of IP 
rights, but with the protection of names in the context of commercial uses. 
Trademark law is designed to protect the integrity of a mark’s meaning by 
preventing uses of the mark that confuse consumers or, for famous marks, uses 
that interfere with consumers’ mental association between mark and good. That 
goal also seems a legitimate justification for the right of publicity. If people are 
misled by the use of a celebrity name or likeness, both they and the celebrity 
are injured. Given that the only ones who benefit do so through deceit, such use 
almost certainly creates a net social harm. 
 
Defining the right of publicity in copyright terms could lead to a finding that it is preempted 
altogether. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 
663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that copyright law preempted a right of publicity claim). 
Courts that have rejected preemption have pointed to the differences between the right of 
publicity and copyright law. See Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 
2005). For an argument for broad preemption of the right of publicity based on the 
Supremacy Clause, rather than 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), see Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright 
Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199 (2002); see also Wendt v. 
Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
134. See infra Part III.B. 
135. Cf. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that “[t]he elements of a Lanham Act false endorsement claim are similar to the elements of 
a right of publicity claim”). 
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The trademark analogy provides not only a reason to protect publicity 
rights, but also a way to understand the limits on those rights. Having a logical, 
coherent explanation for the right of publicity and an established body of case 
law elaborating that explanation allows us to measure the elements, limitations, 
and scope of the right of publicity against an established yardstick. If the 
rationale for a right of publicity claim follows from a parallel trademark claim, 
the substantive scope of that claim should probably also track the trademark 
claim. If it does not, it is worth asking why. Unfortunately, as we will see, 
while the vast majority of right of publicity cases fit within the established 
framework of trademark law, they apply the doctrine in ways that diverge 
significantly from what the trademark analogy would suggest. 
A. Explaining Right of Publicity Cases Using the Trademark Framework 
In this Part, we discuss each of the four major prongs of trademark law and 
their rationales, explain how each serves as an apt description of a significant 
body of right of publicity cases, and then explore the ways in which those right 
of publicity cases have been applied without the justifications or limitations 
that circumscribe the corresponding right in trademark law. 
1. Likelihood of confusion 
Trademark law does not give trademark owners property rights over words, 
even when those words are fanciful. Rather, traditional trademark doctrine 
protects mark owners only against the use of the same or a similar mark as a 
brand, generally by competitors, in circumstances likely to confuse the 
consuming public.136 The rationale for such protection is straightforward. The 
use of brands permits companies to build goodwill in their products, reducing 
the cost to consumers of finding a product with the quality and characteristics 
they are looking for and permitting manufacturers to reap a return on 
investments in product quality.137 If competitors could confuse consumers into 
thinking they were buying a brand-name product when they weren’t, they could 
capture sales by manufacturing cheaper products and deceiving consumers into 
 
136. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) 
(“The Lanham Act was intended to make actionable the deceptive and misleading use of 
marks and to protect persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition.”) (internal 
quotations omitted); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185 (1948); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) 
[hereinafter Lemley, Modern Lanham Act]; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 
48 EMORY L.J. 367, 391 (1999). The dilution and merchandising cases are exceptions to this 
basic principle, and we discuss them separately below in Parts III.A.2 and III.A.4, 
respectively. 
137. For a further elaboration of this search-cost rationale, see our discussion in Dogan 
& Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 11. 
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purchasing them. Consumer expectations would be dashed, and producers 
would no longer have the incentive to invest in quality products. 
The consumer confusion rationale is central to a variety of legal doctrines 
in trademark law. Consumer reactions are consulted to determine whether a 
mark is protectable at all, whether a once-protected mark should be denied 
protection because it is generic, whether a defendant’s mark is sufficiently 
similar to be infringing, and what remedy is appropriate if it is infringing.138 
Consumer reactions also affect other doctrines, from who is entitled to priority 
of trademark use to whether it is permissible to parody a mark.139 
While the classic case of consumer confusion—counterfeiting—involves 
consumers who are confused about the source of the products they buy, 
trademark protection is not limited to cases of source confusion. Courts have 
found infringement even where two related products do not directly compete, 
because consumers might assume that the maker of one also makes the other 
and blame the trademark owner for any defect in the other good.140 Courts have 
also found actionable confusion to occur after the sale or during the initial 
capture of a consumer’s interest.141 Most relevant for our purposes, trademark 
law prevents others from confusing consumers as to the affiliation or 
sponsorship between the trademark owner and the defendant, even if no one 
thinks the trademark owner actually supplied the defendant’s products. Even 
when consumers don’t believe that the trademark owner is the one selling the 
 
138. See, e.g., Zatarain’s Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 
1983) (stating that consumer surveys are important to determine protectability of descriptive 
marks); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) (regarding consumer 
surveys important to find infringement); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 
F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (asserting that views of public are determinative of 
genericness). 
139. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 
1996) (confusion relevant to legality of parody); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday 
Dell Publ’g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); Perma Ceram Enters. v. Preco 
Indus., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1134 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (noting that priority of use of a 
descriptive mark depends on consumer conclusions about meaning of mark). 
140. AMF, 599 F.2d at 341; 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:2 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that trademark law has expanded to 
control uses of a trademark on different but related goods “such that the ordinary buyer 
would be likely to think there was some connection or sponsorship between the producers or 
sellers of goods bearing a similar mark, even though the goods were non-competitive”); see 
also Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099 
(2004).  
141. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (initial-interest confusion actionable even where dispelled before purchase); 
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 221 
F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that confusion by people who see the product after 
purchase is actionable); Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 491-92 
(discussing postsale confusion); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
960, 964 (1993) (same). More recent cases have cut back on initial-interest confusion, 
however. See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005); Bosley Med. Inst. v. 
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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product, the use of a similar trademark may still confuse them by causing them 
to believe that the trademark owner is affiliated with or sponsors the infringer’s 
products. For example, suppose that a company that sells soup uses the trade 
symbol of the Chicago White Sox on its soup cans. Presumably, the White Sox 
do not sell soup, and no reasonable consumer would be likely to conclude that 
she was in fact buying White Sox soup. But consumers might well conclude 
that the soup maker was somehow affiliated with the White Sox or that one 
group had agreed to sponsor the other. This confusion as to affiliation is 
actionable under the Lanham Act, assuming the other requirements for 
protecting a mark are met.142 Trademark law, then, comes into play whenever 
consumers would presume affiliation, sponsorship, or other association 
between the trademark holder and another party selling goods under a similar 
mark.143 The law no longer limits itself to cases of “passing off” goods as 
manufactured or produced by the trademark holder. 
Because celebrities, unlike trademark owners, don’t typically sell products 
themselves, confusion about affiliation or sponsorship is most directly 
analogous to right of publicity cases.144 In a number of right of publicity cases, 
a defendant used a celebrity’s name, image, or identity in an advertisement in a 
way that suggested to viewers that the celebrity was endorsing the product in 
some way, or at least was paid to lend her name to the product. Thus, in Midler 
v. Ford Motor Co.,145 Ford hired an impersonator to copy the vocal style of 
singer Bette Midler for its advertisement. Midler, who refuses as a matter of 
principle to endorse products or lend her songs to advertisements, sued for 
infringement of her right of publicity. The court ruled in her favor, in 
significant part because the defendant was gaining an advantage in the 
marketplace by misleading consumers into believing she had endorsed their 
 
142. Confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship is only expressly addressed in section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, which applies to unregistered marks. But at least one commentator 
has suggested quite reasonably that the protections afforded to unregistered marks under 
section 43(a) also apply to registered marks, whether under section 32 of the Lanham Act or 
under section 43(a). See JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, 
CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 10.01[1][b][i] (2d ed. 2005). 
143. Congress codified this expansion in the Lanham Act, providing a cause of action 
against any person who falsely implies an “affiliation, connection, or association” with a 
trademark holder, or causes confusion “as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities. . . .” 45 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
144. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (calling the 
right of publicity “somewhat akin” to trademark law); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 
U.S.P.Q. 314, 320 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957) (describing the right of publicity as “unfair 
competition under another label”); Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A “Haystack in 
a Hurricane,” 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977, 1054 (1982) (“Analytically, the right of publicity could be 
classified as a form of unfair competition.”); James Treece, Commercial Exploitation of 
Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 647 (1973) (noting the role 
of the right of publicity in preventing consumer deception). 
145. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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products.146 Many other right of publicity cases take this form as well—Waits 
v. Frito-Lay147 and Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds,148 for example.149 Some 
courts have gone so far as to suggest that this is the basic theory behind the 
right of publicity: “The basis of a right of publicity claim concerns the 
message—whether the plaintiff endorses, or appears to endorse the product in 
question.”150 
The use of a celebrity’s name or likeness to falsely suggest she is affiliated 
with or has sponsored the defendant’s goods seems problematic for the same 
reasons as false designation of origin in the trademark context, and it provides a 
valid justification for the right of publicity. Two significant caveats to that 
conclusion are in order, however. First, celebrities might be able to obtain the 
same benefits by using the Lanham Act itself, without the need for a separate 
right of publicity. While the registration of a personal name as a trademark is 
rare,151 section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides similar protections to 
unregistered marks or trade names, and a number of courts have applied it to 
celebrity false endorsement claims.152 
 
146. Id. at 463. 
147. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
148. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
149. See also Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 589 (N.D. Tex. 
1999) (preventing defendant from selling shirts using the phrase “this is Don’s henley” 
because consumers would think musician Don Henley was connected with the shirts); Nat’l 
Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 541-42 (W.D. Tex. 1980) 
(preventing use of “Hints from Heloise” in ways that misled consumers into assuming an 
association with the defendant); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1967) (preventing defendant from using the name of golfer Arnold Palmer to sell a 
golf board game). 
150. Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). 
151. There are some personal names registered as trademarks. O.J. Simpson sought to 
register his name, for example, only to have it opposed by someone who claimed the use of 
his name on products was immoral or scandalous. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999); cf. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that basketball star Kareem Abdul-Jabbar had not abandoned his birth name, Lew Alcindor, 
and reasoning that “[a] proper name thus cannot be deemed ‘abandoned’ throughout its 
possessor’s life, despite his failure to use it . . .”). 
152. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“A false designation of origin claim brought by an entertainer under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act in a case such as this is equivalent to a false association endorsement claim . . . and the 
‘mark’ at issue is the plaintiff’s identity.”); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1992). This interpretation arguably stretches the Lanham Act, which ordinarily requires a 
party to use a term “in the ordinary course of trade,” affixed to goods or in the sale or 
advertising of goods and services, in order to qualify for trademark protection. 15 U.S.C. § 
1051(a) (2006) (requiring use “in commerce”); id. § 1127 (defining use in commerce). The 
stretch is a plausible one, however, because false celebrity endorsements distort the 
information marketplace in the same way as other forms of sponsorship confusion. Cf. Laura 
A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1434-44 (2005) (contending that “reverse passing off” 
doctrine of trademark law should protect against confusion that results when one party 
falsely claims authorship of another’s work).  
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The second caveat flows from the nature of the trademark analogy. 
Consumer confusion justifies the establishment of a right of publicity only to 
the extent that there actually is consumer confusion. If a defendant uses a 
celebrity’s name or likeness in a way that evokes her name but does not 
confuse consumers, this justification will not apply.153 Unfortunately, courts in 
right of publicity cases generally do not ask whether consumers are in fact 
confused.154 Publicity cases rarely include surveys, for example. A significant 
segment of the right of publicity cases, and even the subset of endorsement 
cases, finds no justification under this approach. Examples of cases in which 
the right of publicity has been applied to “endorsements” in the absence of any 
possible consumer confusion include Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable 
Toilets,155 where the defendant used talk show host Johnny Carson’s tag line 
“Heeeere’s Johnny!” for a portable toilet; Spike Lee’s successful suit against 
Viacom enjoining the use of the name “Spike TV”;156 and White v. Samsung, 
where the defendant used a robot in a blond wig that Wheel of Fortune host 
Vanna White claimed evoked her persona.157 There is no question that the 
defendants in some of these cases sought to evoke the plaintiff in the minds of 
their customers, and it is likely that they succeeded. But it is extremely unlikely 
that anyone was confused or believed the celebrity had agreed to the use.158 
 
153. As Judge Rich explained in a trademark case:  
The very fact of calling to mind may indicate that the mind is distinguishing, rather than 
being confused by, the two marks . . . . Seeing a yellow traffic light immediately “calls to 
mind” the green that has gone and the red that is to come, or vice versa; that does not mean 
that confusion is being caused. 
In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Courts have thus commonly allowed 
imitation of famous trade dress by private label retailers seeking to point out the similarities 
between their product and a well-known brand. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores 
Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding no infringement when a private label 
retailer “packages its product in a manner to make it clear to the consumer that the product is 
similar to the national brand, and is intended for the same purposes”); Am. Home Prods. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1070 (D.N.J. 1987) (“The fact that one mark 
may bring another mark to mind does not in itself establish likelihood of confusion as to 
source.”), aff’d, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987).  
154. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he right of 
publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement . . . .”); Univ. 
of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (finding that the right of publicity can be violated even without a likelihood of 
confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (“Proof of 
deception or consumer confusion is not required . . . .”). 
155. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
156. BOLLIER, supra note 105, at 134 (reporting the case and subsequent settlement). 
157. For criticism of the White decision, see, for example, Paul J. Heald, Filling Two 
Gaps in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition: Mixed-Use Trademarks and the 
Problem With Vanna, 47 S.C. L. REV. 783, 806 (1995); David S. Welkowitz, Catching 
Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995). What it says about Vanna White that her persona can 
apparently be captured by a robot is beyond the scope of this Article. 
158. Astoundingly, the Ninth Circuit in the White case reversed summary judgment for 
the defendant on the Lanham Act claim as well, holding that “a jury could reasonably 
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Other cases are closer. In Motschenbacher, for example, the defendant 
used a picture of auto racer Lothar Motschenbacher’s car in its cigarette 
advertisement.159 While the evidence suggested the car was recognizable as 
his, it is far from clear that an appreciable number of consumers would assume 
that he had endorsed the product in that case merely because a picture of his car 
appeared in an advertisement. It’s not impossible that they would,160 but in 
order to know whether the right of publicity should apply, we would want to 
know what consumers thought, just as we would in a trademark case presenting 
the same theory of false endorsement. 
The requirement of confusion is an important limitation on this rationale 
for the right of publicity, just as it is in the ordinary trademark case. This 
explanation will not ordinarily justify a postmortem right of publicity, for 
example.161 Plaintiffs who seek to prevent nonconfusing uses will need to find 
other justifications. Unfortunately, the failure of right of publicity courts to 
explicitly consider the confusion rationale in these cases leads them to stray 
from imposing this requirement consistently.162 The result is that numerous 
people bring lawsuits along the lines of Vanna White’s, alleging not confusion 
but merely recognition.163 Here too the claims may have an analogy to the 
 
conclude that beneath the surface humor . . . lay an intent to persuade consumers that 
celebrity Vanna White . . . was endorsing Samsung products.” White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992). The confusion claim strikes us as 
inconceivable; even in the Ninth Circuit, summary judgment is appropriate in trademark 
cases when the plaintiff’s claim defies common sense. Cf. Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. 
Supp. 849, 861 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“As a matter of law, and of common sense, the use of this 
bottle could not cause a likelihood of confusion either at the critical point of sale or 
afterwards.”). 
159. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
160. Indeed, there is evidence that some viewers understood that the car was his and 
inferred that he was endorsing the product. Id. at 822, 827. 
161. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding no confusion in the use of Princess Diana memorabilia after her death in a 
trademark case). We can imagine only limited circumstances in which a confusion-based 
right of publicity might survive death, such as the use of digital technology to make it seem 
that an actor appeared in a movie in which he did not. See, e.g., Joseph J. Beard, Casting 
Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of Deceased Entertainers—A 21st Century 
Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 146-70 (1993). On the 
problems with a postmortem right of publicity, see, for example, William A. Drennan, Wills, 
Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability 
of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43 (2005); Westfall & Landau, supra note 52, 
at 122. 
162. This may not be an accident. Some courts, most notably those in California, reject 
any effort to limit the right of publicity to situations of false endorsement. See, e.g., 
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (Ct. App. 1983). But as we noted in 
Part II, supra, this begs the question of what does justify the right of publicity in California. 
163. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 n.18 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing examples of suits by Adam 
West claiming the right to remind people of Batman—watch out Christian Bale, George 
Clooney, and Michael Keaton—by the portrayer of “Vampira” against the portrayer of 
“Elvira, Mistress of the Dark”; by Guy Lombardo against those who lead big bands on New 
DOGAN & LEMLEY 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 3/15/2006 8:00:36 PM 
February 2006] WHAT THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CAN LEARN 1197 
recent mutation of “initial-interest confusion” in many courts to make illegal 
any attraction of interest using a trademark. We have critiqued this expansion 
elsewhere;164 for now, it is worth noting the parallels not only between the 
legitimate aspects of trademark law and the endorsement-based right of 
publicity cases but also between overzealous trademark decisions and zeal in 
the right of publicity cases. Trademark courts have recently cut back on initial-
interest confusion,165 and it is well past time for the right of publicity courts to 
do the same. 
2. Dilution 
In exceptional cases, trademark law will prevent the use of a mark even in 
the absence of consumer confusion. The doctrine of trademark dilution, long 
resident in certain state statutes and a feature of the Lanham Act since 1996, 
gives the owners of sufficiently famous marks protection against other 
producers’ uses of those marks even for unrelated goods, provided that the 
defendant is using the term as a mark for its own goods rather than merely as a 
reference to the trademark owner’s goods.166 
Some have criticized dilution law for treating trademarks as property.167 
But like traditional trademark law, dilution properly understood is targeted at 
reducing consumer search costs. Dilution takes two forms: blurring the 
distinctive significance of a mark by associating it with lots of different 
products, and tarnishing the image of the mark by associating it with 
 
Year’s Eve; and by Uri Geller against those who claim to use mind power to bend spoons). 
164. Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 11, at 
819-28; see also Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 
EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) (criticizing expansion of initial-interest confusion doctrine in the 
Internet context); Rothman, supra note 131, at 179-91 (advocating wholesale abandonment 
of initial-interest confusion doctrine).  
165. See supra note 141.  
166. For a general discussion of trademark dilution, see DAVID WELKOWITZ, 
TRADEMARK DILUTION (2002). As currently drafted, the dilution statute requires proof of 
“commercial use in commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). The legislative history 
makes it clear that the term “commercial use” is intended to limit dilution cases to ones in 
which the defendant engages in “commercial speech” as that term is understood in First 
Amendment law. H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 8 (1995). Commercial speech is speech that 
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction.’” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 n.24 (1976)); see also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the doctrine to a right of publicity case). 
Legislation pending in Congress at this writing would change the dilution statute in 
significant ways. See H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005). That bill would remove the rather 
artless phrase “commercial use in commerce” but would require that the defendant make use 
of the plaintiff’s mark “as a mark or trade name.” This should incorporate the same limits as 
the existing commercial speech requirement. 
167. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a 
Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 525, 552 (1995).  
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unwholesome products. Both blurring and tarnishment can make it somewhat 
more difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its owner. 
Blurring takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which consumers can 
associate with the mark owner without any necessary context, and applies it to 
unrelated products—say, Exxon pianos or Exxon carpets. Even if the consumer 
understands that these different Exxons are unrelated, the proliferation of 
Exxon-marked products may make it more difficult for consumers to figure out 
which company is responsible for any particular product. (Quick: What does 
Delta sell?).168 Tarnishment occurs when a defendant uses a mark on unrelated 
goods and services of shoddy quality or of an offensive nature. Even if 
consumers understand that the marks are unrelated, their subconscious 
associations with the mark may be more negative as a result of the tarnishing 
uses. As we have written elsewhere:  
For example, if a defendant sells Toyota brand pornography, those who 
encounter the use may think less highly of the Toyota brand name because 
they subconsciously associate it with pornography, even if they understand 
that the car company did not itself sponsor the materials. By contrast, an irate 
consumer wearing a t-shirt that says “Toyota sucks” or shows a cartoon 
character urinating on the Ford logo isn’t tarnishing the brand in the sense the 
law cares about. These protest uses do not interfere with consumers’ 
association between the logo and the company through some subconscious 
pollution. If anything, they strengthen the mental connection between 
trademark holder and mark, albeit in a way the company might not like.169  
These latter are not actionable under the dilution law.170 
The rationale for dilution might seem to apply to a range of right of 
publicity cases in which a defendant uses a famous celebrity’s name in ways 
that do not confuse consumers.171 And indeed it is possible to think of some 
right of publicity cases that fit into the dilution categories, particularly 
tarnishment. One possible example is the “Velvet Elvis” bar enjoined by the 
 
168. Different Deltas provide airline services, dental health insurance, 
telecommunications, faucets, and a variety of other goods and services. 
169. Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 494. 
170. To be sure, courts applying the tarnishment doctrine have sometimes used it to 
target criticism or derogatory speech about the trademark owner, a result that finds little 
justification in the search-cost rationale. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 
39 (2d Cir. 1994). Those courts are clearly mistaken in their understanding of the doctrine, 
however, and most courts properly distinguish the two. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary 
Comm. Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1046, 1052-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
171. See Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(stating that dilution is “equivalent” to infringement on the right of publicity); Sarah M. 
Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for Protecting Publicity Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (2005) (proposing protection of publicity rights under 
conditions similar to trademark dilution). But see 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 28.02[1] 
(rejecting the analogy). Still, even McCarthy goes on to call dilution “the point at which 
trademark law approaches most closely to the boundary line of the right of publicity.” Id. § 
5.11. 
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Fifth Circuit in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece.172 Elvis is apparently 
dead,173 and it seems unlikely that anyone thinks he or his estate has endorsed 
the bar in question. But suppose he were alive. The bar was designed to be 
kitschy, and if the bar is particularly tawdry one could imagine that even the 
image of Elvis might be undermined in the minds of consumers as a result. 
Similarly, the adoption of a celebrity’s name as a brand for the sale of goods 
(“Angelina Jolie”-brand pianos or “George Bush”-brand carpets) might 
constitute blurring if repeated uses of this sort would make it difficult for 
consumers to know without context whether it was the celebrity or a 
trademarked business that was being referred to.174 A recent case involving the 
use of Rosa Parks’s name as the title of a song whose lyrics had nothing to do 
with Rosa Parks, except for an isolated reference to competing rappers moving 
“to the back of the bus,” might qualify as blurring the image of the celebrity.175 
For the same reasons we think dilution should be prevented in trademark law, a 
true case of dilution of a personal name should also be enjoined. 
But neither blurring nor tarnishment of personal names seems likely to be a 
common occurrence. At the outset, a dilution theory would require proof of real 
fame—not some notoriety, but true celebrity.176 That won’t be so hard to 
prove; most right of publicity cases have in fact been brought by celebrities, 
and there seems little incentive to try to associate one’s products with people 
who aren’t particularly famous. Indeed, the true uniqueness of name that the 
 
172. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
173. But see MEN IN BLACK (Sony Pictures 1997) (“No, Elvis is not dead. He just went 
home.”). 
174. Such uses have occasionally occurred throughout history. Madow reports 
examples including “Benjamin Franklin” handkerchiefs and “Sarah Bernhardt” candy. 
Madow, supra note 14, at 149-52. 
175. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). Critical to the court’s 
conclusion is the fact that the song has nothing in fact to do with Rosa Parks. Id. at 452. 
Songs that talk about a celebrity should be free to use the celebrity’s name, because the use 
is reinforcing and not diluting the connection to the celebrity. Thus, Bree Sharp should not 
face liability for singing “David Duchovny, why won’t you love me?” BREE SHARP, A 
CHEAP AND EVIL GIRL (Trauma Records 1998). Similarly, a record label could use singer Axl 
Rose’s likeness in connection with a rerelease of music by Rose’s previous band, Hollywood 
Rose, because the use had artistic relevance to the content of the material being advertised. 
Cleopatra Records v. Bailey, No. CV 04-3120 GAF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32780, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. May 23, 2005); cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that the band Aqua could use the title “Barbie Girl” for a song about Barbie 
without running afoul of trademark law). 
A closer case is one where the celebrity’s name may also have some connection to the 
product being sold, as in the case of “Here’s Johnny” portable toilets, Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), or a leg-shaving gel named after 
football player Elroy Hirsch’s nickname “Crazylegs,” Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
280 N.W. 2d 129 (Wis. 1979). 
176. J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or 
Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 731-33 (2004) (noting the importance of the fame 
requirement and the problems with relying on a theory of local or niche fame). 
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rationale of dilution seems to require177 is more likely to be present in a 
personal name than in a trademark, since trademarks are often descriptive or 
arbitrary English words with many different meanings.178 
Blurring or tarnishment will be harder to demonstrate. Blurring is 
particularly unlikely in the context of the right of publicity. The general effect 
of the use of a celebrity’s name is not to distract an audience from the 
connection between the name and the celebrity, but to reinforce it. George Bush 
might not like the use of his name for pianos or carpets, and if people think he 
is endorsing the carpets the law will forbid that use, but it seems unlikely that 
people will be slower or less likely to recognize “George Bush” as the name of 
a U.S. President because they must mentally sort through different commercial 
uses.179 And if the use of a name, like the use of a mark, reinforces rather than 
undermines an audience’s connection between the name and the celebrity, it 
will not constitute dilution. A dilution rationale, then, does not offer right of 
publicity plaintiffs carte blanche to prevent nonconfusing uses of their name, 
but a much more limited right to prevent the use of their name as a trademark 
in a way that does not suggest a connection of affiliation between the names.180 
 
177. On the importance of a unique connection between a word and a mark, see 
generally William G. Barber, A “Rational” Approach for Analyzing Dilution Claims: The 
Three Hallmarks of True Trademark Dilution, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 25, 29-30 (2005); Barton 
Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 682-83 (2004); 
Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
35; Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 
(2003). 
178. See McCarthy, supra note 176, at 738-39 (noting examples of arguably famous 
marks that nonetheless share multiple meanings, including Amazon, Tide, Ford, Time, Shell, 
Bell, and Polo). It is possible to imagine circumstances in which two famous people share 
the same name, so that it is already diluted. But it’s not likely to be a common occurrence. 
179. A number of commentators have discussed psychological literature suggesting 
that referential uses of the sort the dilution statute forbids may actually strengthen rather than 
undermine consumer associations with the brands they are evoking. See generally Beebe, 
supra note 177; Goldman, supra note 164. If that is true, there may be no harm from blurring 
at all, and it is only tarnishment that presents a true dilution problem. Cf. McCarthy, supra 
note 176, at 745-47 (questioning whether blurring causes any real harm). But see Thomas R. 
Lee, Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 859, 920 (2004) (noting that blurring by its 
nature cannot actually be observed, but may nonetheless be inferred). 
180. Ironically, the Rosa Parks case, which has been much criticized, see Lisa Tomiko 
Blackburn, Title Blanding: How the Lanham Act Strips Artistic Expression from Song Titles, 
22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 837 (2005); Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. 
REV. 805, 828-29, 851-52 (2005); Mitchell David Greggs, Shakin’ It to the Back of the Bus: 
How Parks v. LaFace Uses the Artistic Relevance Test To Adjudicate Artistic Content, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2004); David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic 
Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 
(2004), may be one of the few examples of a use that might blur the distinctiveness of a 
name by using it to draw attention to unrelated goods. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (“Use of another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion picture is . . . 
not ordinarily an infringement . . . [unless] the name or likeness is used solely to attract 
attention to a work that is not related to the identified person . . . .”). 
Of course, the fact that the Parks case was correctly decided on right of publicity 
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3. Cybersquatting 
With the development of Internet domain names, some unscrupulous 
entrepreneurs called “cybersquatters” managed to make a significant profit by 
registering domain names corresponding to various trademarks and offering to 
sell them to the trademark owner. Because domain names are rivalrous—the 
owner of a domain name such as mcdonalds.com can prevent anyone else from 
using the name—and are allocated on a first-come, first-served basis, there was 
significant value to being the first to own a domain name. Because users would 
often try to find a trademark owner by typing [trademark].com into their 
Internet browsers, at least before the development of accurate search engines 
around the turn of the millennium, the squatter’s interference with that 
connection obviously raised consumer search costs on the Internet. 
Although trademark owners sued on theories of consumer confusion and 
dilution, and frequently prevailed,181 core cybersquatting activity did not fit 
either category very well. Cybersquatters did not necessarily use the site they 
owned at all, making it hard to argue that they were confusing consumers. And 
while famous trademark owners could make a possible blurring argument based 
on the difficulty of finding the trademark owner’s website,182 many victims of 
cybersquatters did not in fact have famous marks.183 Congress solved this 
problem in 1999 by enacting the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
 
grounds doesn’t mean there is no First Amendment problem with restricting the speech. The 
First Amendment might step in if the use of Parks’s name constituted protected speech rather 
than merely proposing a commercial transaction. Cf. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 907 (finding full 
First Amendment protection in the Aqua song “Barbie Girl” because the contents of the song 
included commentary on Barbie). For detailed discussions of the First Amendment problems 
raised by the right of publicity, see Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and 
the First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 
171 (1990); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can’t Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in 
Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 37 (1997); Kwall, 
supra note 94; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 131, at 224-29; Samuelson, supra note 127; 
Edgar Sargent, Comment, Right of Publicity Tarnishment and the First Amendment, 73 
WASH. L. REV. 223 (1998); Edward C. Wilde, The Scope of Liability Under California’s 
Right of Publicity Statutes: Civil Code Sections 990 and 3344, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167 
(1998). 
181. See, e.g., Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 
infringement by registration of the term “Panavision” by a cybersquatter); Archdiocese of St. 
Louis v. Internet Entm’t Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (finding the term 
“papalvisit1999.com” to be a famous mark infringed by a pornographer, despite the fact that 
it had never been used in commerce); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding Intermatic to be a famous mark diluted by cybersquatting). 
182. This argument also seems weak, as the domain name is not in fact being used as a 
mark by the cybersquatter. Tom McCarthy treats the cybersquatting cases as a separate, third 
type of dilution, 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 24:69.1, and some courts have followed this 
approach. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999). 
183. Courts frequently stretched the definition of fame in cybersquatting cases, holding 
names like “Intermatic” to be famous in a significant portion of the United States. 
Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239. 
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(ACPA), which targeted the precise conduct engaged in by cybersquatters.184 
The law focused on bad-faith registration of multiple domain names in hopes of 
selling them and excluded from its scope registration of a domain name by a 
defendant who had some legitimate reason to use it, whether for its own 
trademarked product or to resell or criticize the trademark owner’s products.185 
The same problems that bedevil trademark owners on the Internet also 
affect celebrities. Cybersquatters have registered personal names as domain 
names in a number of litigated cases.186 The injury to celebrities is the same as 
the injury to trademark owners: the celebrity cannot communicate with fans 
using the obvious domain name and may have to pay money to get the name 
back.187 The right of publicity can serve to vindicate the celebrity’s interest in 
such a case. But it is not clear that we need a separate right of publicity to 
achieve this result. The UDRP does not in fact create a cause of action for 
celebrities, though panelists have sometimes granted them relief nonetheless.188 
But the ACPA does contain a right to sue those who cybersquat on personal 
names,189 though its characteristics differ in important respects from the 
protections provided to trademark owners. The right to control cybersquatting 
 
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). In the same month, ICANN adopted the Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Procedure (UDRP), which created a quick, cheap dispute resolution 
procedure. For a list of decisions under the UDRP, see Internet Committee for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), Search Index of Proceedings Under the Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/cgi-bin/udrp/udrp.cgi (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2006). On the design of the system and its shortcomings, see A. Michael Froomkin, 
ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. 
REV. 605 (2002); Michael Geist, Fair.com? An Examination of the Allegations of Systematic 
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903 (2002); Lawrence R. Helfer & 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001); Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control: Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution 
Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 191 (2002). For an argument that the UDRP 
rendered the ACPA unnecessary, see Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the 
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 354-56 (2002). 
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
186. See, e.g., Turner v. Fahmi, No. D2002-0251 (WIPO 2002) (tedturner.com); 
Springsteen v. Burgar, No. D2000-1532 (WIPO 2001) (brucespringsteen.com); Roberts v. 
Boyd, No. D2000-0210 (WIPO 2000) (juliaroberts.com). 
187. Not everyone agrees that this should be a compensable injury even in the 
trademark context. See Kenneth Port, Trademark Monopolies in the Blue Nowhere, 28 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1091 (2002). But it does seem an injury of the sort that can interfere with 
consumer search costs to the extent consumers seek websites by typing in domain names. 
188. See Roberts, No. D2000-0210. But see Turner, No. D2002-0251; Springsteen, 
No. D2000-1532; Diamond v. Goldberg, No. FA0402000237446 (Nat’l Arbitration Forum 
2004) (dustindiamond.com). For a discussion of efforts to use the UDRP to protect personal 
names, see Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes 
Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1361, 1413-35 (2005); Georgette H. 
Tarnow, WWW.YOURNAME.COM: How Useful Is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) in Protecting Personal Names from Cybersquatters?, 22 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 535 (2004). 
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006). 
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on personal names does not require any proof of bad faith, as the trademark 
anti-cybersquatting provisions do.190 But it is also limited to circumstances in 
which the defendant has a “specific intent to profit from such name by selling 
the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party . . . .”191 
This statute captures pure cases of celebrity cybersquatting,192 though cases in 
which the registration of a domain name is used to mislead visitors will have to 
be addressed in other ways. In short, while the right of publicity has a 
legitimate role in preventing cybersquatting, the right doesn’t seem necessary 
to achieve that result in the ordinary case. In this context the Lanham Act 
already achieves most of what the right of publicity would. 
4. Merchandising 
A final theory diverges from the consumer search-cost rationale for the rest 
of trademark law, and instead treats the mark itself as a product over which the 
owner has a property right. This “trademark as property” approach has as its 
most obvious manifestation the assertion of control over merchandise bearing a 
trademark. As we have explained elsewhere:  
When fans buy t-shirts with the name of their school, team, or rock band, they 
are almost always buying a product bearing an established mark entitled to 
some form of trademark protection.193 But the mark in these cases is rarely 
serving the traditional function of a trademark. Rather than indicating 
something to the consumer about the source or sponsorship of a product, the 
mark is the product, or at least is a critical part of what makes the product 
attractive. While the mark may, on occasion, also signal something about the 
source or sponsorship of the shirt, its function transcends the role of a 
traditional trademark. Merchandising cases therefore represent a kind of 
hybrid between product configuration and word-based trademark infringement 
claims: they generally involve protected marks, but the marks are more 
product features than brands.194 
While trademark owners assert a right to control such uses, and there are 
 
190. § 1129(1)(A). 
191. Id. For a discussion of the differences, see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 7:30. 
192. See, e.g., Schmidheiny v. Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
193. As we have explained elsewhere:  
Typically, the mark has acquired trademark status through use in connection with some other 
primary activity, such as baseball entertainment services, educational services, or music 
performance. As such, the mark serves as a source-indicator with respect to these services, 
and the trademark holder would have the right to prevent use of the mark on similar services 
or products. 
 By contrast, in Japan and increasingly in the United States people will sometimes buy t-
shirts that display either an invented logo (one that doesn’t in fact brand a real product) or a 
random collection of words. The case for merchandising protection for such invented logos is 
even weaker than for established trademarks.  
Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 471-72. 
194. Id. 
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some cases that grant such a right,195 a closer look at the merchandising cases 
overall suggests that trademark holders may be relying on a proverbial house of 
cards.196 The theoretical case for creating a property right over trademarks is 
weak in some cases and nonexistent in others.197 There is simply no inherent 
right to be the only one to make money by trading on the value of a trademark. 
The law permits such “free riding” in numerous cases where the defendant 
benefits from proximity to the plaintiff’s mark, so long as the use does not 
increase consumer search costs.198 The doctrinal case fares no better. As we 
have shown elsewhere, courts are at best evenly split as to whether a 
 
195. See, e.g., Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem, 510 F.2d 1004, 
1012 (5th Cir. 1975); Nat’l Football League Props. v. Consumer Enters., 327 N.E.2d 242, 
247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
196. See Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 472-78. 
197. Id. (making that argument). 
198. There are numerous examples where we permit free riding on the goodwill of a 
trademark. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380 (1910) (permitting a mineral 
water producer to use its competitor’s mark to identify the product that it was copying; 
reasoning that as long as the defendants did not create confusion about the real source of 
their product, they were free “to tell the public what they are doing, and to get whatever 
share they can in the popularity of the [trademarked product] by advertising that they are 
trying to make the same article, and think that they succeed”); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape 
Commc’ns, 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing example of 
department stores that locate clothing from competing manufacturers next to their own house 
brands). As we explained elsewhere: 
The trademark use doctrine has broad application: because of it, newspapers are not liable for 
using a trademarked term in a headline, even if the use is confusing or misleading. Writers of 
movies and books are not liable for using trademarked goods in their stories. Makers of 
telephone directories are not liable for putting all the ads for taxi services together on the 
same page. In-house marketing surveyors are not liable for asking people what they think of 
a competitor’s brand-name product. Magazines are not liable for selling advertisements that 
relate to the content of their special issues, even when that content involves trademark 
owners. Gas stations and restaurants are not liable for locating across the street from an 
established competitor, trading on the attraction the established company has created or 
benefiting from the size of the sign the established company has put up. Individuals are not 
liable for use of a trademark in conversation, even in an inaccurate or misleading way 
(referring to a Puffs brand facial tissue as a “Kleenex,” or a competing cola as a “Coke,” for 
example). Generic drug manufacturers are not liable for placing their drugs near their brand-
name equivalents on drug store shelves, and the stores are not liable for accepting the 
placement. They may be making money from their “uses” of the trademark, and the uses may 
be ones the trademark owner objects to, but they are not trademark uses and therefore are not 
within the ambit of the statute. 
Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 11, at 809-10. 
The assumption that free riding must be rooted out is an increasingly common one in 
intellectual property law. Indeed, David Franklyn has argued that a focus on free riding, and 
not any overarching theory of trademark protection, best explains the trademark dilution 
cases. See David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of 
the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004). 
One of the authors has elsewhere explained why the focus on free riding is mistaken. Mark 
A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005); 
Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097 
(2005); see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free 
riding were prohibited within it.”). 
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merchandising right even exists and are even more dubious of its existence in 
the absence of consumer confusion.199 Merchandising is likely to receive an 
even colder reception in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s trademark 
jurisprudence over the past decade has shown a return to core trademark values, 
with consumer expectations as a central focus and the value of competition 
paramount.200 At the very least, these cases validate the trend toward requiring 
confusion in merchandising cases, and away from the more generalized right 
enunciated in Boston Hockey and its progeny. But they may go much further. 
Beyond reaffirming an approach to trademark law heavily rooted in 
informational harm and consumer expectations, these opinions manifest a deep-
rooted concern for the inherent value of competition in product markets. If 
competitive markets are the ultimate goal, the solution, even in merchandising 
cases raising risks of sponsorship-based confusion, may lie in something short 
of an absolute injunction against use of the mark.201 This fact makes it all the 
more surprising that trademark owners, retail businesses, and even government 
officials simply assume the existence of such a right.202 
Given the weakness in the trademark owners’ claim to ownership of a 
property right in their trademarks, it is quite surprising that the right of 
publicity appears increasingly to be based on just such a theory.203 Right of 
publicity plaintiffs don’t just want to prevent the use of their names and 
likenesses in commercial advertising that may falsely suggest endorsement or 
blur the connection between the name and the person. Rather, they seek to (and 
increasingly do) control any use of their name or image (or any other aspect of 
their “personality”)204 for profit, even where the desire is to depict the plaintiff 
in an artistic or news format. Thus, the estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
199. Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 472-78. This doctrinal 
disagreement is not limited to the United States. In Arsenal Football Club v. Reed, [2003] 
EWCA (Civ.) 96 [3]-[5] (Eng.), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) established a 
merchandising right, holding that if both the marks and the goods sold were identical it did 
not matter whether consumers were confused. The U.K. trial court refused to give effect to 
this judgment, however, ruling that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the ECJ and that Reed’s 
sale of merchandise featuring the logo of the Arsenal football team did not infringe Arsenal’s 
trademark. The House of Lords ultimately reversed, requiring the establishment of a 
merchandising right. [2003] ETMR (Civ.) 73. 
200. Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 11, at 496-506.  
201. See generally Bone, supra note 140, at 2182-83 (advocating disclaimer as the 
exclusive remedy in merchandising cases generally). 
202. See, e.g., James Cyphers, Companies Join Police in Pursuing T-Shirt 
Bootleggers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1991, at B2 (noting law enforcement actions against the 
sale of t-shirts bearing trademarks and logos). 
203. Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the 
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 627 (1984) (noting the 
analogy, but concluding that it “cannot be conclusive”). 
204. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.5 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, 
C.J., concurring) (objecting to the application of the right of publicity to all aspects of one’s 
personality because she could not find “any easily applied definition for this amorphous 
term”). 
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successfully prevented a defendant from selling busts of King, not because 
people were confused or thought that the estate sponsored them, or because 
they would somehow dilute King’s image, but on a theory that the defendant 
was trading on goodwill that ought to belong to King’s family.205 Similarly, the 
descendants of the Three Stooges prevented sales of an artistic t-shirt featuring 
their likenesses on the theory that the t-shirt seller profited from the use of 
those likenesses.206 Arnold Schwarzenegger filed suit against the makers of 
Schwarzenegger bobblehead dolls.207 Jessica Simpson sued a company that 
sold a ring that looked like her wedding ring.208 And numerous cases hold that 
t-shirts, posters, buttons, and other memorabilia violate the right of publicity.209 
The complaint is not that the defendants engaged in commercial speech 
because they advertised something—they didn’t—but that they are making 
money using the famous name.210 Perhaps broadest in this respect is the Ohio 
right, which appears to preclude the use for one’s own “benefit the name or 
likeness of another,” whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one.211 
Even cases that reject merchandising-style right of publicity claims 
generally do so not because of the problems with a claim of inherent 
entitlement, but because they see some countervailing value to permitting the 
use. Thus, in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., the court rejected Tiger 
Woods’s claim to own the exclusive right to depict his image in works of art, 
not because there was no basis for such a right but because the particular 
painting at issue in that case was art of sufficient quality that the court thought 
it was protectable expression.212 Had the defendant in that case depicted Tiger 
Woods on a t-shirt, the court might well have reached the opposite 
 
205. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
206. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
207. John Broder, Schwarzenegger Files Suit Against Bobblehead Maker, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 18, 2004, at A16. 
208. Simpson v. Inspired Silver, Inc., No. SACV 05-3 (DOC (ANx) (C.D. Cal. filed 
Jan. 3, 2005). 
209. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1981); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. b (1995) (“An unauthorized 
appropriation of another’s name or likeness for use on posters, buttons, or other memorabilia 
is . . . ordinarily actionable as an infringement of the right of publicity.”). 
210. Cf. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding the use of an image of Dustin Hoffman on a magazine cover to be commercial 
advertising or promotion because the goal of the use was “to draw attention to the for-profit 
magazine in which it appears” and therefore help sell copies). 
211. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 1976), aff’d, 
433 U.S. 562 (1977). To be sure, Zacchini appeared to be a particularly compelling case for 
the plaintiff, whose entire fifteen-second act was shown for free on the nightly news. But the 
statement of the right of publicity by the Ohio Supreme Court is sweeping indeed, and would 
appear to encompass any kind of news reporting, commentary, or discussion, even in a 
private home. 
212. 332 F.3d 915, 936-38 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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conclusion.213 Indeed, the court in ETW referred to the right of publicity as “the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her 
identity.”214 And in Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., the court 
rejected a right of publicity claim by football player Joe Montana only because 
the defendant’s use was a reproduction of a newspaper page, and newspapers 
were entitled to special protection.215 
Claims of this sort don’t work under trademark law. With the exception of 
a couple of cases, trademark courts tend to base merchandising rights on proof 
of consumer confusion rather than on some naked right to control any use of a 
mark. Nor do trademark courts try to draw a distinction between “high art” and 
commerce.216 In Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum, Inc. v. Gentile 
Productions, for example, the plaintiff protected the unique design of its 
museum as a trademark and sought to prevent the defendant, a photographer, 
from selling postcards depicting the Cleveland skyline and prominently 
featuring the museum.217 The court did not try to decide whether the 
defendant’s photographs were sufficiently artistic; instead it found that the 
plaintiffs had not made “trademark use” of the overall design of the museum to 
brand particular goods.218 
The disconnect between the limited merchandising right in trademark law 
and the broad interpretation given to the right of publicity is striking. One could 
imagine a right of publicity that extended to t-shirts or note cards in particular 
cases because a significant segment of the public believes that the celebrity or 
his estate sold or sponsored the goods. But the right of publicity cases never 
even ask this question. Rather, courts presume the answer to what would be the 
central factual question in a trademark inquiry. Doing so comes at a significant 
price to the public, both in terms of speech and economics. Individuals wanting 
to express their identification with a particular celebrity, cause, or sports team 
have to pay a higher price to do so under this expansive reading of the right of 
 
213. See id. at 938; cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2), (3) (2005) (attempting to 
exempt “single and original work[s] of art” and “work[s] of political or newsworthy value,” 
as well as advertisements for such works, while creating liability for uses of works that are 
“so directly connected with a product, article of merchandise, good or service as to constitute 
an act of advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases . . . by the deceased personality”). As if 
that weren’t confusing enough, the section just quoted applies only to dead people; an 
entirely different statute applies to living persons. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (2005). 
214. ETW, 332 F.3d at 928. 
215. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Gionfreddo v. Major League 
Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Ct. App. 2001). 
216. Cf. Greggs, supra note 180, at 1302-14 (explaining how the right of publicity 
cases attempt to draw such a distinction). 
217. 134 F.3d 749, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1998). 
218. Id. at 754-55. Interestingly, the court expressly drew an analogy to the attempt to 
register images of celebrities as trademarks, distinguishing one particular image serving a 
brand-identifying function from the overall look of the celebrity himself. Id. (citing Estate of 
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1363-64 (D.N.J. 1981) (concluding that use of one 
image of Elvis Presley as a mark did not justify trademark rights over all pictures of Elvis)). 
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publicity than they would under a system that allowed uses that did not imply 
source-identification or endorsement.219 Companies that provide useful goods 
and services, like fantasy sports leagues, face suits claiming that they have no 
right to use data that relates to an individual.220 Given the weakness of the 
merchandising theory in trademark cases, it seems unwise to base so much of 
the right of publicity on an expanded version of a merchandising right. 
B. Do We Need a Separate Right of Publicity at All? 
If we are right that trademark law is the closest analogy to the right of 
publicity, it is reasonable to ask how far that analogy extends. Might we be 
better off without a right of publicity altogether, relying on the Lanham Act 
itself to protect the trademark-like interests we have identified? Certainly the 
Lanham Act has provided relief in a number of cases involving publicity 
interests.221 Some commentators have suggested abolishing the right of 
publicity outright.222 We think there are two reasons to retain the doctrine in 
independent form, however. 
1. Non-trademark theories 
First, not all explanations for the right of publicity fit neatly within the 
trademark framework. We discussed two such explanations in Part I—the 
circular justification that “I own it because it’s mine” and the historical privacy-
protecting justification for the right. The former maps most neatly to the 
merchandising right, though some (notably McCarthy) have argued that control 
over one’s name is more properly thought of as a natural right than a trademark 
 
219. These economic and speech costs come into play not only with t-shirts and other 
plainly expressive merchandise, but also with pencil sharpeners and other trinkets. While the 
gravity of the speech interests may well differ somewhat from one product to the next, courts 
should not get into the business of making such content-based distinctions absent some 
compelling reason to recognize a merchandising-based publicity right in the first place.  
220. See, e.g., Neil deMause, Fantasy Firefight, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, Feb. 16, 
2005, http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=3763. 
221. See, e.g., Rostropovich v. Koch Int’l Corp., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing cellist Mstislav Rostropovich to prevent the sale of a CD with 
copies of his work); Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding 
that Jesse Jackson could prevent the sale of a video of his speech and bearing his likeness 
because people might believe he had authorized the video); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. 
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that Woody Allen could stop the use of look-alikes who 
might confuse viewers). 
222. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, but He Shouldn’t Be: The Right of 
Publicity Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 625-28; cf. Usha Rodrigues, Note, Race to the 
Stars: A Federalism Argument for Leaving the Right of Publicity in the Hands of the States, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1209 (2001) (arguing against a federal right of publicity in part 
because the Lanham Act already takes care of legitimate publicity interests). 
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is.223 But as we explained in Part I.B, there is no such natural right in a 
personal name. We permit countless uses of another’s name for profit, in all 
sorts of contexts—newspapers, comedy routines, movies, and books, to name 
but a few. The natural rights theory of the right of publicity fits imperfectly 
with trademark law, but it fits imperfectly with the right of publicity as well. It 
is not, in our view, a defensible justification for a right of publicity, so the 
imperfect fit doesn’t present a problem for our theory. 
Privacy-based justifications for the right of publicity, by contrast, are 
legitimate and depart from the trademark rationale. They have the advantage of 
history—the right of publicity itself began as one of four privacy torts 
elucidated in the famous Warren-Brandeis article.224 To the extent that the right 
of publicity is in fact justified on a privacy theory,225 that theory properly 
coexists with reputation-related theories of the sort we discuss in this Article. 
We think, however, that inclusion of privacy-based publicity requires only a 
minor modification to the broad sweep of our reputation-based approach. 
Privacy is implicated only when a plaintiff seeks to avoid commercial exposure 
and is unwillingly subjected to it.226 It therefore coexists uneasily, if at all, with 
celebrity, since most of the celebrities enforcing the right of publicity 
affirmatively want commercial use made of their name—they just want to get 
 
223. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:8 (arguing that the Lanham Act can’t protect 
right of publicity interests because he believes the right of publicity doesn’t require any 
element of falsity). Trademark law does show some extra solicitude toward personal names, 
particularly in older decisions. See, e.g., Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 
(1891) (“A man’s name is his own proper[t]y, and he has the same right to its use and 
enjoyment as he has to that of any other species of property.”); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a personal name cannot be 
abandoned through non-use); Stix, Baer & Fuller Dry Goods Co. v. Am. Piano Co., 211 F. 
271, 274 (8th Cir. 1913); Burgess v. Burgess, 43 Eng. Rep. 351, 354 (1853). But trademark 
courts have not hesitated to enjoin the use of one’s own name for commercial purposes 
where that use might in fact confuse consumers. See, e.g., Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids 
Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 472 (1914); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 
1280 (9th Cir. 1992); Basile, S.p.A. v. Basile, 899 F.2d 35, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Taylor 
Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1978); Hat Corp. of Am. v. 
D.L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D. Conn. 1933). And efforts to take advantage of any 
special solicitude toward personal names by changing one’s name have not fared well. See 
Univ. of Oxford v. Seagle, No. D2001-0746 (WIPO Aug. 14, 2001) (ordering transfer of 
domain name university-of-oxford.com despite claims of registrant, who had legally changed 
his personal name to Oxford University). 
224. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16. 
225. Some courts have held that this is the only permissible justification for a right of 
publicity. See, e.g., Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 
1984). 
226. Some noncelebrity cases have a different flavor—an individual is happy to have 
his or her image used for commercial purposes, but wants more money. Thus, Russell 
Christoff won $15.6 million from Taster’s Choice Coffee even though he had been paid to 
model for them, on the theory that posing in a model shoot did not give the defendants the 
right to use the pictures they had taken. See Taster’s Choice Model Wins $15.6M Judgment 
From Nestle, IP L. BULL., Feb. 2, 2005, http://www.iplawbulletin.com/chi-bin/absolutenm/ 
anmviewer.asp?a=2966&z=18. 
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paid for it.227 A privacy rationale is also inconsistent with the idea that an 
individual’s right of publicity can be assigned like any other form of property. 
While there are a few cases in which noncelebrities assert the right of publicity 
because they really do want to be left alone,228 they are neither the typical right 
of publicity cases229 nor the cases likely to create problems for the doctrine.230 
2. Imperfect fit of trademark protection 
A second reason to maintain an independent right of publicity is that some 
of the requirements of trademark law don’t translate well to the context of the 
right of publicity.231 First, trademark law generally requires that the trademark 
 
227. One exception may be Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462-63 (9th Cir. 
1988), where the plaintiff refused to do commercial advertising at all. See also Waits v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing false endorsement claim by Tom 
Waits, who rejected commercial endorsement opportunities as a matter of principle). Other 
exceptions involve claims that are really variants on the privacy tort of public disclosure of 
private facts, such as the European paparazzi cases, see Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1 (2004); Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.), or cases addressing 
videos involving the plaintiff’s nudity or sexual conduct. The problem with treating these 
latter claims under the right of publicity is that, at least under the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition, liability depends on whether the plaintiff’s image was used in advertising to 
sell products not featuring the plaintiff, something not true in these cases. See Lane v. MRA 
Holdings, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1213-15 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting liability where 
plaintiff’s image was used to advertise the video in which she was featured). Contra Bosley 
v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 922-23 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (finding liability where 
plaintiff’s image was used to advertise a video, regardless of the fact that she was featured). 
228. See Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(extending protection to noncelebrities, but noting a split among courts as to whether 
noncelebrities are even entitled to assert a right of publicity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995). 
229. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 4:14 (“[M]ost reported right of publicity cases have 
involved plaintiffs who were ‘celebrities’ . . . . ”). 
230. While most privacy claims involve noncelebrities, there are two limited 
circumstances in which celebrities might have a legitimate privacy-related cause of action. 
First, the fact that celebrities have sought the spotlight does not mean that they have waived 
all expectations of privacy; they may still have a claim based on the unauthorized disclosure 
of truly private matters, when the intrusiveness of the disclosure outweighs any potential 
newsworthiness of the content. Such a claim may fall within the rubric of public disclosure 
of private facts, or the tort of intrusion upon a party’s solitude or into her private affairs. E.g., 
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 828 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (granting 
preliminary injunction against the distribution of video showing celebrity couple engaged in 
sexual intercourse). Second, particularly given the ease of manipulation of digital 
photographs, celebrity images may sometimes be modified and presented in a false and 
harmful light. In these circumstances, the celebrity could bring a claim based on the tort of 
false light privacy. See Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the 
Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 565-66 
(2000) (noting availability of false light privacy claims in cases involving alteration or 
manipulation of celebrity images in ways that cause personal distress). 
231. Cf. Konsky, supra note 171, at 362-63 (arguing that adoption of a publicity 
dilution statute would be preferable to simply incorporating personal names into the 
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owner use the mark in commerce in the United States, on or in connection with 
the sale of goods or services.232 While some courts have extended the Lanham 
Act to cover “signature” uses of celebrity identities in the false endorsement 
context,233 others suggest that those who use a name as a brand may not be 
entitled to protect other aspects of their personality, such as their image or 
voice, under trademark law,234 at least without proof that each particular aspect 
had acquired secondary meaning.235 These requirements make little sense in 
the context of personal likeness. There should be no requirement of use in 
commerce or secondary meaning under the right of publicity;236 noncelebrities, 
foreign celebrities, and celebrities who refuse to trade on their name ought 
equally to be able to prevent confusing or diluting uses of their names and 
likenesses. 
A second problem with eliminating the right of publicity altogether lies in 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp.237 There, the Court properly rejected efforts by the former owner of 
an expired copyright in a television series to use trademark law to prevent the 
sale of a copy of the series by others on the theory that they were passing off 
the plaintiff’s work as their own. The Court’s rationale, however, suggested 
that trademark law could never provide a cause of action against “the use of 
 
trademark dilution statute because “[a]s it stands, trademark law is not equipped to subsume 
the right of publicity”). 
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006) (requiring “use in commerce”); § 1127 (defining “use 
in commerce”). For a discussion of the history and importance of the trademark use doctrine, 
see Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming February 2006).  
233. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1401 (9th Cir. 1992).  
234. See, e.g., Condit v. Star Editorial, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (E.D. Cal. 2003) 
(rejecting a trademark claim based on identity where the plaintiff had never commercialized 
her identity); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1363-64 (D.N.J. 1981) 
(rejecting claim that estate of Elvis Presley was entitled to trademark all uses of his image). 
235. See, e.g., Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that 
author’s name lacked sufficient secondary meaning to justify passing-off claim); ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A]s a general rule, a person’s 
image or likeness cannot function as a trademark.”); Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 
579, 583 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] photograph of a human being . . . is not inherently ‘distinctive’ 
in the trademark sense . . . .”); Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“If Allen’s claim is that his likeness rather than his face is a trademark, it 
would not appear to be dilutable . . . .”). 
236. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 348 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(holding that secondary meaning was not required). But cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 
P.2d 425, 428, 430 (Cal. 1979) (requiring proof of secondary meaning to protect a right of 
publicity after death); Brees Co., Inc. v. Brees Co., Inc., No. FA0506000493869 (NAF July 
28, 2005) (concluding football star could not win cybersquatting complaint against defendant 
who registered his name before he became famous). McCarthy calls the Lugosi decision “an 
unfortunate mish-mash of terminology.” 4 MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 4, § 28:8 
n.5. 
237. 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
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otherwise unprotected works and inventions without attribution.”238 Rather, a 
trademark cause of action for a copyrighted work was limited to misleading the 
public as to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and 
[does] not [extend] to the author of any idea, concept, or communication 
embodied in those goods.”239 Whatever the merits of Dastar as a matter of 
trademark law,240 the right of publicity should chart a different course. No one 
should be permitted to use an actor’s or author’s name to falsely suggest 
connection or endorsement merely because the copyright in the underlying 
work in which the name appeared has expired. Copyright lasts for a sufficiently 
long time that copyright protection will rarely expire before the right of 
publicity does, but should that occur, the right of publicity ought to survive.241 
A final reason for the continued need for the right of publicity lies in the 
rare dilution-type right of publicity case. Unlike the Lanham Act’s general 
unfair competition provision,242 the federal dilution statute applies only to 
“famous” and distinctive trademarks.243 The categorical language of the FTDA 
makes it unlikely that the statute would apply to the blurring or tarnishment of a 
celebrity’s identity, particularly in the Second Circuit, which excludes personal 
names from dilution protection altogether.244 The right of publicity should play 
 
238. Id. at 36.  
239. Id. at 37. 
240. For trenchant criticism of the decision, see, for example, Jane C. Ginsburg, The 
Author’s Name as a Trademark: A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of ‘Paternity’? 
(Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-91, 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=724343 (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark 
Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 (2005). But see Jonathan Band & Matt 
Schruers, Dastar, Attribution, and Plagiarism, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (2005) (defending the 
decision on both legal and policy grounds). 
241. The preemption of the right of publicity by copyright law is a complex field. Most 
courts agree that copyright law does not wholly preempt the state right of publicity. See, e.g., 
Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910-11 (7th Cir. 2005). But the right of publicity 
cannot interfere with the ability of copyright owners to distribute their movies merely 
because the actor is portrayed in those works. See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 
(Ct. App. 1996). One court has extended that reasoning to conclude that baseball players 
could not assert right of publicity claims in their game performances or their images in 
uniform, because those were embodied in copyrighted telecasts. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1986). 
The extent of copyright preemption may depend on whether the right of publicity 
claimed is a traditional one limited to commercial advertising and false endorsement, or 
whether it extends to any use of an image. The latter sort of claim seems equivalent to a 
copyright owner’s exclusive right to copy or display a work, and therefore more likely to be 
preempted. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Note, Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association: The Right of Publicity in Game Performances and Federal Copyright 
Preemption, 36 UCLA L. REV. 861, 881-82 (1989). 
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
243. § 1125(c). 
244. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(requiring inherent distinctiveness for protection against dilution). Because personal names 
are treated as descriptive, they will not meet this standard regardless of their fame. 
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a continuing role in those cases. 
While these differences justify the existence of a right of publicity 
independent of trademark law, and with somewhat divergent rules, they do not 
undermine the power of the trademark analogy or rise to the level of an 
independent justification for the right of publicity. Rather, they are better 
understood as adaptations designed to achieve trademark-related goals like 
preventing confusing false endorsements in the somewhat different context of 
personal names. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADEMARK APPROACH 
If courts were to turn to trademark law to understand the justifications for 
and limits on the right of publicity, how would that affect the law? We see two 
significant effects, both in our view beneficial: the right would have a less 
expansive scope than some recent decisions have given it, and courts would not 
hesitate to apply the First Amendment to limit the right of publicity. 
A. Substantive Implications for Right of Publicity Doctrine 
First, the rationales we offered in Part III for the right of publicity are not 
coextensive with the broad scope some states have given the doctrine. While 
some states, like Florida, properly limit the doctrine to use of a name or 
likeness in commercial advertising and promotion, rather than extending it to 
any use made for profit245 (and even then permit accurate advertising of the 
contents or nature of a product246), other states have let their right of publicity 
drift well beyond logical doctrinal moorings. California is the most notable 
example. The California right of publicity has turned from a right to prevent the 
use of a name to suggest endorsement without consent into a right to control 
almost any use of any reference to a person if the user makes money as a 
result.247 Further, California law extends this right for decades after a person’s 
 
245. See, e.g., Valentine v. CBS, Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 433 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that 
Florida right of publicity law requires proof that the plaintiff’s name or likeness was used to 
promote a product or service); Lane v. MRA Holdings, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215 (M.D. 
Fla. 2002) (“[T]he publication of Girls Gone Wild is not actionable simply because it is sold 
for a profit.”); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005). 
246. Lane, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1213 (allowing producer of video to use image of 
plaintiff in promoting a video that included footage of plaintiff). 
247. The California Civil Code provides that anyone who uses another’s “name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, 
or for purposes of advertising or selling” must forfeit his or her profits and shall also be 
liable for damages and attorneys fees. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (2005) (emphasis added). 
The statute exempts use “in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or 
account, or any political campaign,” § 3344(d), but by its terms holds liable anyone who 
depicts another in a work of art, a movie or television show, a play, a song, or a book. 
Movies such as “Forrest Gump” and “Contact,” which depict fictional characters interacting 
with real historical figures, would therefore violate California’s right of publicity. So too 
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death, albeit with further restrictions than it does during his life.248 California 
courts have occasionally recognized that this expansive right needs some limits, 
but they have generally turned to copyright analogies in a fruitless search for 
limiting principles.249 As we explained in Part II, however, copyright is not the 
right analogy. Thinking about the right of publicity by comparing the plaintiff’s 
claim to the goals served by trademark law will help courts and legislators to 
find coherence in the doctrine and to avoid some of the expansive readings 
given that doctrine by courts that acted without a clear sense of what purpose 
the law was designed to serve.250 
The trademark analogy may have other doctrinal implications as well. For 
example, courts in trademark cases apply a doctrine known as “trademark use,” 
which limits infringement claims to those defendants who have used a mark in 
connection with the sale or advertising of a good or service.251 The trademark 
use requirement serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of trademark 
law without requiring a factual inquiry into consumer confusion. The rationale 
for the doctrine stems from the practical reality that it would be both unwise 
and impossible to permit trademark owners to control every use of their marks. 
People and businesses use trademarks every day, in conversation, in news 
reporting, in songs, and in books. Trademark law has never given trademark 
owners exclusive control over every use of their marks. Rather, the law is 
designed to prevent consumer confusion by those who brand their own goods 
or services with a mark sufficiently similar to the plaintiff’s mark such that 
consumers may be deceived into believing there is some connection between 
the two. Individuals and companies may make reference to, or use of, a 
trademark without fear of liability unless they are making a trademark use. 
The trademark use doctrine, albeit in a somewhat modified form, may 
 
would “Bowling for Columbine” or any other movie in which a documentary filmmaker 
depicts a person against her will. 
248. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (2005). Unlike section 3344, which applies to living 
people, this section exempts any “play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, 
audiovisual work, radio or television program, single and original work of art, work of 
political or newsworthy value, or an advertisement or commercial announcement for any of 
these works . . . .” § 3344.1(a)(2). Even this broader list leaves an artist liable if she makes 
even one reprint of her work. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 
797, 810 (Cal. 2001). 
249. E.g., Saderup, 21 P.3d at 808-10. 
250. See Konsky, supra note 171, at 347-48 (proposing to limit a right of publicity she 
considers “too unwieldy and overbroad” by requiring proof of the same elements required in 
a trademark dilution claim). 
251. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408 (2d Cir. 
2005) (finding no infringement when defendant “d[id] not ‘use’ [plaintiff’s] trademark in the 
manner ordinarily at issue in an infringement claim: it [did] not ‘place’ [plaintiff’s] 
trademarks on any goods or services in order to pass them off as emanating from or 
authorized by” the plaintiff); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-80 (9th 
Cir. 2005). For an extensive discussion of the trademark use doctrine, see Dogan & Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 11, at 805-11. 
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provide an important tool for checking the right of publicity. Because most 
publicity cases will involve associational uses rather than source-indicating 
uses, the type of connection between product and celebrity identity differs 
somewhat from the typical connection between product and trademark in 
Lanham Act infringement suits. Nonetheless, we believe that the right of 
publicity, properly understood, should require a use of celebrity identity as a 
tool for marketing goods and services, not merely an attempt to refer to a 
celebrity.252 
Resort to trademark doctrines should also affect the alienability of the 
publicity right. As currently conceived, the right of publicity is freely 
assignable.253 McCarthy justifies this result by reminding readers that he 
considers the right of publicity  
an inherent property right . . . not analogous to a trademark in this respect. A 
trademark . . . is merely a symbol of the good will value of an ongoing 
business. The right of publicity is not so much a symbol of something as it is 
legal recognition of proprietary value of the persona of every human being.254 
We have explained above why we think the “inherent property” idea is wrong, 
and indeed in this case self-contradictory: if we must recognize a right of 
publicity because someone’s persona is inherently his or her own, it makes 
little sense to treat it as property that can be sold freely. Does it follow from our 
trademark-based view that the right of publicity cannot be assigned? 
With some significant caveats, we think that it does.255 A trademark-
related justification for the right of publicity focuses attention on the use of a 
personal name to falsely suggest sponsorship or to draw some other mental 
connection in the minds of an audience between the celebrity and a commercial 
product. Individuals should have the right to prevent such uses, and the 
corresponding right to authorize them in exchange for money by choosing to 
endorse certain products.256 But they do not need a right to assign their name in 
 
252. Limiting the right of publicity in this way will admittedly allow some third-party 
uses that may have a negative impact on celebrity image. Certain celebrities, for example, 
might disdain the use of their images on t-shirts and other merchandise and might view the 
sale of such items as a cheapening of their carefully constructed personas. More commonly, 
however, the celebrity’s primary objective is not so much to prevent all merchandising uses, 
but to exert control over such uses in order to maximize her profit from them. In our view, 
the economic and speech-related costs of such celebrity control outweigh the interests of 
individual celebrities in the rare case in which merchandising uses cause identifiable harm. 
253. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, §§ 10:10-14; cf. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (permitting the grant of an exclusive 
license to a publicity right). 
254. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 10:12. 
255. Cf. Westfall & Landau, supra note 52, at 122 (arguing that some commercial 
transactions over the right of publicity make sense, but that it should not be inheritable or 
treated as property more generally in marital property and bankruptcy contexts). 
256. Melville Nimmer argued half a century ago that “[t]he pecuniary worth of 
publicity values will be greatly diminished if not totally destroyed if these values cannot be 
effectively sold.” Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
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gross in order to make money from endorsements. They need only the right to 
license others to use their name for certain products. Trademark owners have a 
similar right; they need only make sure that they supervise the circumstances in 
which their name is being used.257 The same thing makes sense in the context 
of the right of publicity. Individuals should be entitled to license others the 
right to use their name, but if they relinquish all control over that name by 
selling it to another, the use of their name is more likely to confuse than to 
inform.258 We think outright assignments, as opposed to licenses of a publicity 
right, should be forbidden, just as they are in trademark law.259 
At the same time, not all trademark doctrines will translate readily into the 
right of publicity context. The policies underlying trademark law’s fair use 
doctrine, for example, do not have the same persuasive force in the context of 
celebrity identity. While competitors have an obvious need to use well-known 
trademarks to compare the merits of competing products, they do not have the 
same compelling need to use the name or likeness of celebrities with which 
those products have become identified.260 Fair use and comparative advertising 
defenses are therefore less likely to succeed in right of publicity cases. 
 
203, 212 (1954). But in the context of his discussion, it is clear that the right need not 
actually be sold, only licensed, for a celebrity to derive economic value from it. 
257. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995); 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 18:42 (discussing the requirement that trademark owners 
supervise licensing). For debate on whether this is a good rule in the trademark context, 
compare Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 786 (1990), and 
Lemley, Modern Lanham Act, supra note 136, at 1709-10 (defending the rule), with Irene 
Calboli, Trademark Assignment “with Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57 
FLA. L. REV. 771 (2005), and Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks—Why the 
Anti-Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used as 
Collateral, 77 TEX. L. REV. 465 (1998) (proposing elimination of the rule). 
258. This means that it will usually be the celebrity, not a licensee, who has standing to 
bring suit to enforce the right of publicity. Cf. Interplanet Prods. Ltd. v. K Myers, No. FA 
0504000449882 (Nat’l Arbitration Forum June 28, 2005) (refusing to transfer domain name 
elizabethtaylor.com to plaintiff, a trademark licensee of Elizabeth Taylor, because she and 
not the licensee controlled the residual rights to her name). We think this is as it should be. 
259. Trademark owners can assign their rights if they do so as part of a sale of the 
goodwill of the company. See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F.2d 207, 208 (6th Cir. 
1986); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 1982). But in the 
right of publicity context, precisely because the right is personal to the owner, it makes little 
sense to speak of the sale of the individual’s celebrity to another. 
260. Such uses may well establish a connection in consumers’ minds between the 
celebrity and the competing product even if the competitor includes a disclaimer. Experience 
in trademark cases has suggested that disclaimers are generally ineffective at dispelling 
confusion as to association. See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King 
Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting a “growing body of academic 
literature” concluding “that disclaimers, especially those . . . which employ brief negator 
words such as ‘no’ or ‘not,’ are generally ineffective”); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a 
Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 
59 (1986). 
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B. The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment 
Relying on the trademark rather than the copyright analogy will also ensure 
a continued role for the First Amendment in the right of publicity. Some courts 
and commentators have assumed that limiting the publicity right to commercial 
speech solves the First Amendment problem, since commercial speech is not 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.261 But as Judge Kozinski noted in 
his White v. Samsung dissent, “less protected means protected nonetheless.”262 
Commercial uses of someone’s likeness are speech subject to First Amendment 
protection, and in many cases the speech will have clear political or social 
content that would be stifled by application of the right of publicity.263 Indeed, 
White itself is an example. White involved a humorous parody of the set of the 
game show Wheel of Fortune in 2012 A.D., in which host Vanna White had 
been replaced by a robot in a blond wig. It is hard to understand how the 
injunction against that parody could survive ordinary First Amendment 
scrutiny, for example.264 
Further, the right of publicity doesn’t arise only in the context of 
commercial speech. The diminished protection afforded commercial speech is 
generally limited to commercial advertising; certainly the fact that an item is 
sold commercially doesn’t make it commercial speech, or else most 
newspapers, magazines, and books would fall into this less protected category. 
The courts, though, have found right of publicity violations in some 
noncommercial uses of a plaintiff’s image. For instance, while sculptures—
such as busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.—are generally seen as core protected 
speech, the King estate won a right of publicity case against the distributors of 
such sculptures.265 Paintings, photographs, and even inscriptions on t-shirts are 
generally seen as core protected speech,266 but they too may infringe the right 
 
261. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 3:46 (listing and discussing cases). Portions 
of this paragraph and the next one are adapted from Lemley & Volokh, supra note 180, at 
225-26. 
262. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Further, Eugene Volokh notes 
that in California at least truthful commercial speech is now entitled to full constitutional 
protection. Volokh, supra note 76, at 925-27. 
263. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 142 (2004) (“[T]he right of publicity thus threatens to suppress 
expression and to give celebrities the power to censor alternative versions of their 
images . . . .”). 
264. See White, 989 F.2d at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“[N]ot allowing any means of reminding people of someone? That’s a speech 
restriction unparalleled in First Amendment law.”). 
265. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
266. See Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no 
question that the t-shirts are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech 
clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather 
than given away.”); Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 
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of publicity.267 
The speech-restrictive implications of a right to prevent someone else from 
talking about you should be obvious.268 They parallel the concerns with giving 
a company the right to prevent someone else from speaking about it. 
Trademark cases resolve those concerns by limiting liability to circumstances 
in which the defendant engages in commercial speech that is false or 
misleading.269 Where a use is expressive and not merely commercial speech, 
trademark courts generally apply the First Amendment.270 First Amendment 
cases involving the right of publicity have traditionally done the same thing, 
limiting the application of the doctrine to commercial speech and focusing 
attention on false endorsement. Where the right of publicity overstepped those 
bounds, courts have not hesitated to use constitutional law to rein it in.271 
 
1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that merchandise which exhibits protected expression is 
protected speech); cf. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 & 
768 (1988) (holding that the act of selling protected works is itself protected speech). 
267. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
licensees of “Cheers” television show could violate the right of publicity by using robots that 
looked like characters from the show in “Cheers” theme bars); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, 
Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a poster depicting Elvis Presley 
infringed the Presley estate’s right of publicity); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. 
Supp. 1201, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that t-shirts depicting band logos violated the 
right of publicity), aff’d on other grounds, 735 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1984); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. b (1995) (“An unauthorized appropriation of 
another’s name or likeness for use on posters, buttons, or other memorabilia is . . . ordinarily 
actionable as an infringement of the right of publicity.”). In our view, the sort of “decor 
speech” at issue in Wendt doesn’t fit within the traditional definition of commercial speech, 
because it doesn’t propose a commercial transaction. 
268. See Shubha Ghosh, On Bobbling Heads, Paparazzi, and Justice Hugo Black, 45 
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271. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding First Amendment interest in selling baseball card parodies 
outweighed right of publicity); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(holding the right of publicity could not prevent a fictionalized biographical narrative about 
plaintiff); Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 TORT & 
INS. L.J. 635 (1995); Dougherty, supra note 65; Ellis, supra note 127; Bruce P. Keller & 
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Courts may not always get it right in trademark First Amendment cases, but 
they are at least engaging in the right analysis. 
Copyright law, by contrast, has long gotten a free ride from the First 
Amendment, despite considerable scholarly commentary explaining the 
dangers copyright poses to free speech,272 on the theory that such limiting 
doctrines as fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy prevent the conflict 
 
Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 
TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1009 (2004) (“It is not surprising, then, that courts have incorporated 
trademark-like First Amendment and fair use defenses into their right of publicity 
analyses . . . .”); Tyler Trent Ochoa, Introduction: Tiger Woods and the First Amendment, 22 
WHITTIER L. REV. 381 (2000); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America, 
Inc.’s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free 
Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995). But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562 (1977) (finding no First Amendment obstacle to a right of publicity claim 
against a news broadcast that captured the entirety of plaintiff’s fifteen-second human 
cannonball act). 
There is a considerable literature discussing the First Amendment and the right of 
publicity. See, e.g., Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171 
(1990); Michael E. Hartmann & Daniel R. Kelly, Parody (of Celebrities, in Advertising), 
Parity (Between Advertising and Other Types of Commercial Speech), and (the Property 
Right of) Publicity, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 633 (1995); Kaplan, supra note 180; 
Kwall, supra note 94; Samuelson, supra note 127; Volokh, supra note 76; Wilde, supra note 
180; Alicia M. Hunt, Comment, Everyone Wants To Be a Star: Extensive Publicity Rights 
for Noncelebrities Unduly Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605 (2001); 
Sargent, supra note 180. 
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18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 983 (1990); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First 
Amendment After Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. REV. 983; 
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989); Geri J. 
Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 79 (1996); Mel Marquis, Comment, Fair Use of the First Amendment: Parody 
and Its Protections, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1997); cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, 
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 296-97 (1996) (offering 
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First Amendment). 
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from ever arising.273 We worry that if courts draw on copyright rather than 
trademark analogies in understanding the right of publicity, one unintended 
byproduct of that reliance will be to let First Amendment limits on the right of 
publicity fall by the wayside as well. Arguably that was the effect of the 
Court’s analysis in Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co.,274 where it 
repeatedly analogized the purposes of the right of publicity to copyright law in 
the course of rejecting a television news team’s claim to be entitled to 
broadcast a fifteen-second performance it deemed newsworthy. 
CONCLUSION 
Gerard Magliocca claims that the right of publicity “emerge[d] from 
trademark infringement’s shadow.”275 If so, perhaps it is time for the right to 
return to that shadow. The best justifications for a right of publicity are 
trademark-based justifications, and trademark law, unlike the right of publicity, 
has developed a generally coherent set of rules designed to promote those 
purposes. The overlap isn’t complete—there are ways in which trademark rules 
must be modified to accommodate the particular characteristics of personal 
identity—but it is sufficiently great that the rights and limitations of trademark 
law should serve as the baseline for defining and limiting the right of publicity. 
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